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INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court announced in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena' that federal affirmative action programs will be subject to "strict
scrutiny, "2 a debate has reemerged over what constitutes a compelling
government interest for classifications that favor traditionally disadvantaged
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. Steven Bainbridge, Jeremy Bulow,
John Donohue, Richard Fallon, Paul Gewirtz, Kenneth Karst, Paul Klemperer, Peter Maggs, George
Rutherglen, Eric Talley, Tom Ulen, Eugene Volokh, and seminar participants at the University of
Illinois provided helpful comments. The detailed comments of Akhil Amar and Evan Caminker
particularly aided my rewriting of an initial draft. (Professor Ayres has advised the Justice
Department in its post-Adarand review of affirmative action. The opinions expressed in this Essay
are not necessarily the views of the Justice Department.) Catherine Sharkey provided excellent
research assistance.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
2. Strict scrutiny analysis has two prongs. The government must show (1) a "compelling
purpose" and (2) that the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are "narrowly tailored."
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
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races.3  This Essay, however, does not address this interesting and vital
issue. It instead focuses on the second prong of strict scrutiny analysis: the
requirement that racial classifications "must be narrowly tailored" to further
the compelling government interest at stake.
While many people believe that the government never has a compel-
ling interest to use racial classifications, for the purposes of this Essay I ask
the reader to accept the holdings of both Adarand and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.4 that remedying past discrimination can constitute such a
compelling interest.5  Specifically, imagine that the Department of Trans-
portation could show that past and present disparate treatment by private
and public actors has caused the market share of qualified minority guard-
rail contractors to be substantially below what it would be without dis-
crimination.6 Assuming that a federal court found sufficient evidence to
3. For example, Justice Thomas in his Adarand concurrence suggested that the government
would never have a compelling interest to enact a racial classification. Akhil Amar and Neal
Kumar Katyal, however, argue in this Symposium that Justice Powell's holding in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)-that promoting diversity in education might consti-
tute a compelling governmental interest under the strict scrutiny standard-is still good law.
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996). But see
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (holding that the
diversity rationale is not a compelling government interest).
While affirmative action programs often create preferences for women, the constitutionality
of such programs is not herein considered. Sex classifications need not satisfy the dual require-
ments of strict scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (under intermediate scru-
tiny, classification need only be substantially related to important governmental objectives).
Consequently, legislatures may find that they cannot engage in racial affirmative action, but that
they can pursue affirmative action on the basis of gender. Judge Kozinski, for example, in review-
ing a San Francisco program, struck down racial preferences but rejected a facial attack on prefer-
ences for women, finding such preferences valid under the Equal Protection Clause. Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City of S.F., 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987). There are several
indications, especially from Justice O'Connor, however, that gender preferences might be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny or something very close to it. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
Justice O'Connor referred to "the close examination ... we have engaged in when reviewing
classifications based either on race or gender." 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989). This is consistent with
her concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Education, where she intimated that strict and inter-
mediate scrutiny were not so different. 476 U.S. 267, 286-87 (1986); see also Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (sex discrimination demands "'an exceedingly
persuasive justification"' (quoting Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981))).
4. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
5. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor emphasized:
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lirigering effects of racial discrimi-
nation against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government
is not disqualified from acting in response to it.
115 S. Ct. at 2117.
6. By assuming both past and present discrimination by both private and public actors, I
am intentionally attempting to conflate important issues of what constitutes a sufficient predicate
for establishing the government's compelling interest. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 26
(discussing types of past and present discrimination that might justify affirmative subsidies to
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demonstrate a compelling government interest to increase minority partici-
pation,7 this Essay considers what types of affirmative action programs
would satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement. 8
increase minority participation). Croson made clear, however, that government "can use its
spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the
particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment":
It would seem equally clear, however, that a state or local subdivision (if delegated
the authority from the State) has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimi-
nation within its own legislative jurisdiction.. . . [l]f the city could show that it had
essentially become a "passive participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by
elements of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city could take
affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92 (footnotes omitted). The possibility that remedying private discrimi-
nation within an industry could be a compelling government interest might substantially expand
the scope for affirmative action because disparate treatment against minority workers and appli-
cants is likely to be more prevalent in the private than the public sector.
It is unclear, however, how far the government might go in trying to remedy private discrimi-
nation. If minorities, absent discrimination, would control 10% of both private and public con-
struction contracts, the government might argue that 15% of its construction jobs need to go to
minorities to compensate for private discrimination (which holds the minority market share of
the private market to only 3%). Alternatively, the court might hold that government cannot
seek a public market share that is greater than what the share would be in the absence of public
and private discrimination. This latter interpretation would be especially likely if the court held
only private discrimination that affected public decisionmaking-such as a private certification
process improperly disqualifying minority contractors from bidding on government projects-
constituted a sufficient basis for remedial action.
7. Assuming the government could have a compelling interest to increase minority partici-
pation as a remedy for past discrimination is also controversial, as Drew Days has observed:
[Some critics of affirmative action] are willing to allow the explicit use of race only in
situations where "identifiable victims" of discrimination are compensated. The defini-
tion of "identifiable victims," however, is often so narrow that it leaves most blacks, as a
class, without redress for the harms that this society has caused them.
Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 457 (1987) (footnote omitted). While requiring
individual beneficiaries to establish that they were the identifiable victims of discrimination
might easily be comprehended by a version of the narrow tailoring principle, I assume that a
showing of disparate treatment by private and government actors (which cannot be remedied
merely by prospectively prohibiting discrimination, see supra note 6) is sufficient to justify a
government motive to increase minority participation. See Geier v. Alexander, 593 F. Supp.
1263, 1265 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), aff'd, 801 F.2d 799 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument of the
Reagan Justice Department that the school desegregation remedy of a special "pre-enrollment"
program for 75 black college sophomores is unconstitutional because the 75 black students who
stood to benefit were not "actual victims" of discrimination).
8. This Essay does not address what would satisfy the narrow tailoring requirements when
the government's compelling interest is based on the educational benefits of a diverse student
and/or faculty community. Extracting narrow tailoring requirements that support one type of
compelling interest and applying them in other contexts is dangerous. For example, Justice
Powell's insistence in Bakke that race be one of several preferential characteristics may make
sense when the compelling interest is to be achieved through diversity, but narrow tailoring does
not mandate the inclusion of nonracial preference categories when the compelling interest is
remedying past discrimination.
HeinOnline -- 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1783 1995-1996
1784 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
Two criticisms of the Supreme Court's narrow tailoring approach in
Adarand and Croson form my central thesis:
1. The Court's preference for "race-neutral means to increase minority
participation" is inconsistent with narrow tailoring and may not be a less
restrictive alternative than explicit racial classifications. Extending affirma-
tive action subsidies to non-victim whites produces less-tailored, over-
inclusive programs. And because both race-neutral and explicitly racial
means share the same race-conscious motivation of remedying past discrimi-
nation, it is not clear that race-neutral means represent a less restrictive
alternative.
2. The Court's (and others') antipathy for quotas is overstated. Quotas
may be more narrowly tailored to achieve the government's remedial inter-
est than many racial preferences. While quotas are imperfectly tailored
because they mandate an inflexible level of minority participation, bidding
credits (and other preferences) may be poorly tailored because they induce
too much uncertainty and volatility in minority participation. More narrowly
tailored programs will exhibit a "sliding scale" of racial preferences in
which the size of the preference will vary inversely with the degree of suc-
cessful minority participation in the program. Under a narrowly tailored
program, the farther minority participation falls below what it would be in
the absence of discrimination, the larger the racial preference government
might legitimately confer.'
Together, these criticisms suggest that when the government has a compel-
ling interest to remedy past discrimination, the narrow tailoring principle
should not bar racial classifications that tailor the size of the preference to
the remedial need.
Sliding-scale preferences may come close to setting aside a minimum
quota of contracts for minority bidders,'0 but this Essay will show that
such quasi-quotas (for fractions of the legitimate remedial goal) are consis-
tent with narrow tailoring when dramatic shortfalls in minority participa-
tion would undermine the government's remedial effort. For example, in
an industry where the government has a legitimate interest in increasing
9. Under this sliding-scale approach, for example, minorities might be granted a 25%
bidding credit for one-third of the procurement contracts, a 15% bidding credit for an additional
third of the contracts, and no bidding credit for the remaining third. How to implement a slid-
ing scale is discussed infra at notes 102-103.
10. For example, the FCC granted minority- and female-controlled firms 50% bidding
credits for one-eighth of the licenses auctioned in recent paging auctions; these substantial credits
effectively set aside these licenses for the designated entities. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton,
Pursuing Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction
Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
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minority participation to thirty percent (what it would be absent discrimi-
nation), the government might find that allowing minority participation to
fall below five percent would affect the long-term viability of all minority
business. Under such circumstances, the government might be justified
under the narrow tailoring principle in granting substantial bidding credits
for five percent of government contracts, effectively guaranteeing that at
least five percent will go to minorities.
Quasi-quotas might satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement for four
reasons:
(1) Unlike an absolute quota, a quasi-quota, by assuring a mini-
mum level of minority cost-effectiveness, would at least to a small
degree tailor the level of participation to the strength of minority
applicants.
(2) A quasi-quota would only be appropriate if the government
found that shortfalls in participation below some minimum level
would seriously undermine the government's remedial effort. In
such circumstances, a quasi-quota would be better tailored because
it would cause decisionmakers to internalize the true social costs
of dramatic shortfalls in minority participation.
(3) Because a quasi-quota would only set aside a fraction of the
government's legitimate remedial goal, it would impose a smaller
burden on the interests of non-beneficiaries.
(4) Effectively granting minority enterprises guarantees of mini-
mum participation can increase the quality of minority
participants-so as to reduce the disparity between minority and
non-minority recipients."
In sum, the Court's distaste for explicitly race-based remedial programs,
particularly programs with quota-like attributes, cannot be adequately justi-
fied by resort to the narrow tailoring principle.
The first two sections of this Essay explore dichotomous choices that
policymakers face in designing an affirmative action program: whether the
preference should be- explicitly racial; and, if so, whether the preference
should take the form of a quota or credit. In contrast to the top-down
reasoning of these sections, the last section then briefly surveys current
affirmative action programs and current evidence of past discrimination to
consider what types of programs satisfy the narrow -tailoring requirement.
11. Just as a university can stimulate the strength Of minority applications by guaranteeing a
critical mass of admitted minorities, effectively guaranteeing a minimum amount of minority
contracting may stimulate sufficient minority participation to bid away the effects of a substantial
racial credit. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
Narrow Tailoring 1.785
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I. WHEN DOES NARROW TAILORING MANDATE RACE-NEUTRAL
MEANS?
The idea that a remedy needs to be tailored to further the govern-
ment's legitimate interest is unexceptional-and is captured by the idea
that remedial classifications should not be too overinclusive or under-
inclusive. 2 In considering the validity of affirmative action remedies for
past discrimination, the Supreme Court's primary concern has been over-
inclusion; that is, giving affirmative action preferences to people who were
not affected by past discrimination. 3 For example, in Croson, Justice
O'Connor challenged the inclusion of nonblack minorities in Richmond's
affirmative action plan:
There is absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against Spanish-
speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut persons in any aspect of
the Richmond construction industry .... It may well be that Rich-
mond has never had an Aleut or Eskimo citizen....
If a 30% set-aside was "narrowly tailored" to compensate black
contractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why
they are forced to share this "remedial relief" with an Aleut citizen
who moves to Richmond tomorrow? The gross overinclusiveness of
Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the city's claim of
remedial motivation.'
4
This represents a straightforward application of the narrow tailoring princi-
pal: The Richmond preferences were not narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination because some of the beneficiaries were not victims of past
discrimination.
12. The underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness of a classification may be so severe that it
cannot be said that the legislative distinction "rationally furthers" the posited state interest. See
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 35 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628, 636-37 (1974). With regard to suspect classifications, the requirement has been dis-
cussed in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 486-87 (1980) (warning of "deleterious effects of
even benign racial or ethnic classifications when they stray from narrow remedial justifications").
"[Tlhe [Minority Business Enterprise] provision cannot pass muster unless, with due account for
its administrative program, it provides a reasonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic
criteria will be limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress .... " Id. at 487; see
also Croson, 488 U.S. at 488-89; Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
13. As a theoretical matter, one might also conclude that an underinclusive program is not.
narrowly tailored if victims of discrimination are arbitrarily excluded from the affirmative action
preferences.
14. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
1786
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After this plausible beginning, however, Croson uses narrow tailoring
as a reason for "the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation."15 Just two paragraphs later, Justice O'Connor argues that
the racial preferences were not narrowly tailored because the Richmond
City Council did not consider a variety of race-neutral subsidies, including
small business preferences, reduced bond requirements, and "training and
financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races." 6 In essence,
before implementing a racial classification, Croson requires policymakers to
find that race-neutral means could not achieve the government's compel-
ling interest. 17
The problem with this requirement is that the "overinclusion" version
of narrow tailoring, if anything, points away from race-neutral subsidies. If
preferring the minuscule number of Aleuts in Richmond is "grossly over-
inclusive," then extending preferences to a much larger class of whites a
fortiori would fail the narrow tailoring requirement. Whites, .even more
than Aleuts, are not the victims of race discrimination. Narrowly tailoring
the' beneficiary class for remedial subsidies so that it will not be over-
inclusive necessitates explicit racial classifications.
A simple way to resolve this apparent tension would be to admit that
race-neutral subsidies (for, say,. small businesses) are overinclusive in ways
inconsistent with narrow tailoring, but to point out that race-neutral classi-
fications are not subject to the narrow tailoring requirement. This solution,
however, is not satisfactory. As emphasized below,'" Justice O'Connor is
recommending "the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation."19 While legislatures could have a variety of motivations to
pass small business subsidies that would not give rise to strict scrutiny, the
purpose of "increas[ing] minority participation" triggers strict scrutiny and
the narrow tailoring requirement.
15. Id. at 507.
16. Id. at 507,510.
17. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) ("'[Courts]
should give particularly intense scrutiny to whether a nonracial approach or a more narrowly
tailored racial classification could promote the substantial interest about as well and at tolerable
administrative expense."' (alteration in original) (quoting Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of
"Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 578-79 (1975)));
Days, supra note 7, at 483 ("I can see no good reason to require government agencies in this
position to experiment with remedies that do not involve explicit racial classifications if these
remedies offer no likelihood of success. Agencies should, however, demonstrate that these lesser
alternatives were systematically and thoroughly explored prior to being rejected.").
18. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
19. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
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Still, Justice O'Connor's inclination toward race-neutral means might
be squared with another version of the narrow tailoring principle. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,20 Justice Brennan noted that
"a government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or
which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny'
and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose
and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available."21 When
applied to racial classifications, this principle seems to require the govern-
ment to achieve its compelling remedial interest in the way that least
restricts or burdens the fundamental rights of the program's non-
beneficiaries.22 Justice Powell in Bakke noted:
We have never approved a classification that aids persons per-
ceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of
other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.
After such findings have been made, the governmental interest in
preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is
substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindi-
cated. . . . [T]he remedial action usually remains subject to continu-
ing oversight to assure that it work the least harm possible to other
innocent persons competing for the benefit.23
In a footnote in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,24 the Supreme
Court described the "less restrictive alternative" requirement as being a
subpart of narrow tailoring:
The term "narrowly tailored," so frequently used in our cases, has
acquired a secondary meaning. More specifically, as commentators
have indicated, the term may be used to require consideration of
20. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21. Id. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
22. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596 (1990) (stating that "we do not
believe that the minority ownership policies at issue impose impermissible burdens on non-
minorities"), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 549 (arguing that Richmond's initiative "impose[d] only a diffuse burden on
nonminority competitors") (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282 (stating that the
"actual burden shouldered by non-minority firms is relatively light" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-08 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
24. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
1788 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
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whether lawful alternative and less restrictive means could have been
used.25
Whether viewed as an independent requirement or as a subpart of narrow
tailoring, this "less restrictive alternative" principle conflicts with the prin-
ciple that affirmative action preferences be narrowly tailored to victims of
discrimination: Narrow tailoring of subsidies to the victim class requires
racial classifications that exclude non-victim whites from the remedial
subsidy, while the Supreme Court-via something like the "least restrictive
alternative" principle-disfavors such classifications.
To resolve this doctrinal conflict, it is useful to articulate what larger
purposes the narrow tailoring and least restrictive alternative principles are
meant to serve.26 Although stated in a variety of somewhat amorphous
ways, several commentators have suggested that the purpose of strict scru-
tiny is to limit the racial divisiveness caused by remedial efforts.27 Aspects
of both the narrow tailoring and less restrictive alternative requirements
can be squared with this meta-purpose: Granting government benefits to
minorities that were not the victims of past discrimination smacks of the
25. Id. at 280 n.6. This "less restrictive alternative" requirement can be shoe-homed into
the category of narrow tailoring as a requirement to narrowly tailor the burdens of affirmative
action. Justice O'Connor's Aleut analysis in Croson, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, is
consistent with an attempt to narrowly tailor the benefits to the victim class. But tailoring the
burden might also intimate that costs of affirmative action subsidies should only be borne by the
class of those who discriminated or those who benefited from discrimination. Justice O'Connor's
approach of race-neutral subsidies paid for by taxpayers generally forces "innocent individuals" to
bear the burden of racial preferences and does not attempt to tailor the costs so that they are
borne by non-innocents.
Narrow tailoring of the costs has proven to be politically, if not empirically, infeasible.
Instead of narrow tailoring, the Supreme Court's approach in Bakke (and in the Title VII cases
reviewing private affirmative action) is to require that the burdens of remedial racial preferences
be distributed broadly. Distributing the costs of affirmative action broadly does not constitute
"narrow tailoring" of costs, but it might be more tailored distribution of the costs than unduly
trammeling the interests of a discrete group of "innocent individuals." As an empirical matter,
focusing the burden of procurement affirmative action on incumbent non-minority firms might be
a narrower tailoring of the burdens to the class of people who have benefited from past discrimi-
nation (than distributing burdens among the general population).
26. Analysis of doctrinal categories when disconnected from their purposes may become
rather hollow manipulations. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
27. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1913, 1949 n.88 (1996) ("[Rlace-based affirmative action might serve to inflame race-
consciousness and.., should be regarded as a 'suspect' policy that should not be implemented in
the absence of strong, even compelling justification.").
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illegitimate interest group politics that strict scrutiny was meant to "smoke
out." And, superficially at least, race-neutral classifications seem less likely
to provoke the kind of racial enmity that would itself undermine the reme-
dial purpose of the legislative action."8 This possibility might provide a
rationale for the least restrictive alternative requirement to take priority
over the requirement that the beneficiary class not be grossly overinclusive.
The Constitution might tolerate or even require an overinclusive class of
beneficiaries if a race-neutral proxy were less likely to inflame further preju-
dice and divisiveness.
This constitutional preference for race-neutral means is strongest when
considering simple mandates for race-blind decisionmaking. If merely
enjoining disparate treatment (by government and private actors) could
adequately remedy past and current discrimination, this type of injunction
would clearly be less restrictive-especially judged by the meta-purpose of
minimizing racial division-than explicit racial classifications. But in
Croson, Justice O'Connor implicitly acknowledged that remedying past and
current discrimination may require more than merely prohibiting prospec-
tive disparate treatment.29 When Croson declares a preference for race-
neutral means, it is contemplating affirmative subsidies-including training,
bond and financial subsidies for small or disadvantaged entrepreneurs-that
the legislature would not grant absent its desire to remedy past (and possibly
ongoing) disparate treatment. 30  Unlike the simpler mandates to end dis-
parate treatment, Croson takes on the harder task of comparing two differ-
ent kinds of "affirmative" remedies, which by hypothesis are only enacted
because of the government's race conscious efforts to remedy past discrimi-
nation.
28. Cf. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983) (busing may be race-
neutral but still faces great opposition).
29. The government may not be able to induce adequate compliance with such a non-
discrimination decree, and even if it could, the vestiges of past discrimination may have left
minorities with shortfalls in access to financial, physical, and human capital that might lead to
long-term disparities in economic participation.
30. If government in the past had originally increased the bond requirement because of its
likely disparate effect on minority entrepreneurs, it would not be an affirmative subsidy to reduce
the bond requirement to where it would be in the absence of discrimination. What I am calling
"affirmative" remedies are those that require the government or a private actor to allocate bene-
fits other than it would if it were colorblind. Race-neutral remedies that merely seek decision-
making that does not take race into account (such as prohibiting prospective disparate treatment
or reducing bond requirement to where they would have been in the absence of prior race con-
sciousness) would be constitutionally preferable to explicit racial subsidies, if such race-neutral
remedies by themselves could be effective in remedying past and present discrimination.
1790
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The point here is not merely that the preference for race-neutral subsi-
dies contradicts the overinclusiveness prohibition,3 but to take on the
idea that race-neutral subsidies are less restrictive alternatives-or in some
sense less of a burden on constitutional norms concerning racial divisive-
ness.
Properly understood, the Court's idea of "race-neutral means" is not
necessarily less restrictive than affirmative action programs with explicit
racial classifications. The central problem is that the race-neutral means
still have a race-conscious motivation. The key phrase from Croson, which
is quoted again in Adarand, is the admonition that policymakers must
consider "the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business parti-
cipation."32 The Court is still counseling legislatures to engage in race-
conscious decisionmaking-to enact certain subsidies because of the race of
the beneficiaries. And, of course, the Court cannot avoid this causal con-
nection: Any race-neutral program attempting to remedy past racial dis-
crimination would necessarily have a motive to benefit the victimized race.
After Washington v. Davis,33 it would seem that citizens' core equal protec-
tion interest is in being free from the effects of racially motivated legislative
action.34  Thus understood, the Court's preference for "facially-neutral,
but racially-motivated" programs cannot sidestep strict scrutiny analysis.
35
Justice Scalia has argued that the legislature's motive in granting such
31. If this were the only problem with the Court's approach, it might simply admit that
something like an overinclusion prohibition was subordinate to something like a "less restrictive
alternative" requirement.
32. City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (emphasis added),
quoted in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995).
33. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
34. One might try to reframe the fundamental right at stake as a right not to be denied
government benefits because of one's own race-and then argue that explicit racial classifications
burden this right more than "racially-motivated, but facially-neutral" classifications. This
reframing, however, fails to capture the breadth of the equal protection interest. Specific non-
beneficiaries of facially nonracial classification may not be denied benefits because of their indi-
vidual race, but they are assuredly denied because the race of other citizens (as a class) induced
the particular nonracial means. Accordingly, if a legislature levied a special tax on a neigh-
borhood because the population was disproportionately Hispanic, an Anglo resident of the neigh-
borhood, upon showing the legislature's intentional discrimination, should be able to bring a
successful equal protection challenge.
35. Even though Adarand, in an early parenthetical, claims that "this case concerns only
classifications based explicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by
laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are moti-
vated by a racially discriminatory purpose," 115 S. Ct. at 2105, the Court's discussion of race-
neutral means presents just these difficulties. The race-neutral means are necessarily "motivated
by a racially discriminatory purpose" of benefiting the minority victims of past discrimination.
Narrow Tailoring 1791
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subsidies is not racially motivated, but is motivated by a desire to remedy
past racial discrimination:
A State can, of course, act "to undo the effects of past discrimi-
nation" in many permissible ways that do not involve classification
by race. In the particular field of state contracting, for example, it
may adopt a preference for small businesses, or even for new
businesses-which would make it easier for those previously excluded
by discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may well have
racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race.
36
This type of hair-splitting should not, however, exempt such decidedly race-
conscious legislative activity from strict scrutiny. While there are still nice
questions about what degree of legislative race-consciousness rises to the
level of "intentional discrimination" for purposes of equal protection analy-
sis, the hypothesized genesis of Justice O'Connor's race-neutral subsidies is
sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. Last term in Miller v. Johnson,37 the
Supreme Court, in assessing whether a facially race-neutral districting plan
violated the Equal Protection Clause, formulated the following "predomi-
nant factor" standard:
Redistricting legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of
racial demographics; but it does not follow that race predominates in
the redistricting process. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979)
("'Discriminatory' purpose' . . , implies more than intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision-
maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects")
(footnotes and citation omitted) .... The plaintiff's burden is to
show, either through circumstantial evidence ... or more direct
evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision . ... 3
The Adarand/Croson preference for "race-neutral means to increase minority
participation" clearly contemplates legislative action "because of" its effects
on minority entrepreneurs. And while it is difficult to clearly specify the
36. Croson, 488 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring).
37. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
38. Id. at 2488 (citations omitted).
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minimum requirement for establishing a "predominant" motivating fac-
tor,39 it should not be difficult to conclude that subsidies fashioned to
increase minority participation are predominantly motivated by race. If we
intend to subject racially motivated legislation to strict scrutiny, at the end
of the day we must still answer which racially motivated means is the least
restrictive alternative. And in conducting this analysis, the Supreme Court
cannot use legislative motive to distinguish between "explicitly-racial" and
"race-neutral" means, because, by hypothesis, they share the same
motive.4
If one cannot distinguish on the basis of motive or degree of the legis-
lature's race-consciousness, then in what other sense might race-neutral
means be less of a burden on constitutional interests? Here I would like to
consider two ways in which "racially motivated, but facially neutral" might
be "less restrictive"-especially in the sense of inducing less racial divisive-
ness.
A. The Argument from Opaqueness
First, it could be argued that race-neutral means induce less racial
divisiveness because the citizenry is less likely to learn of the legislature's
underlying race-conscious motivation. Even if empirically true (or maybe I
39. This adjective seems to require plaintiffs to show that race was more than one of many
"but-for" causes for the legislative action, and instead show that race was in some vaguely speci-
fied sense the "but-for" cause. Miller's predominant factor test itself conflicts with Adarand's
consistency principle-"the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not depen-
dent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification." Adarand, 115 S.
Ct. at 2100 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494). While plaintiffs challenging a redistricting bene-
fitting minorities must show that race was a predominant motivating factor, I imagine that a
plaintiff challenging a redistricting that disfavored minorities would only have to show that race
played a role in the legislative decision. But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980),
and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982), in which minority plaintiffs challenging multi-member
districting schemes were required to show that race had been a significant motivating factor.
40. The text has focused on the quality of the impact on non-beneficiaries, but one might
also argue that explicit racial classifications are likely to have greater quantitative impacts on the
non-beneficiaries than racially motivated, but race-neutral classifications. Justice Powell's con-
cern that non-beneficiaries should not be completely insulated from competing for the benefits
seems to turn on the degree of the racially motivated preference. But this concern (even if well-
justified) should not militate for race-neutral means. A racially motivated set aside, given only to
people born in the inner city, might insulate non-beneficiaries from the opportunity to compete
just as much as an explicit racial classification. Thus, even if the degree of harm borne by non-
beneficiaries militates against quotas and set asides-a subject addressed in the next section-this
concern should not inform whether racially motivated remedies should be race-neutral or not.
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should say, especially if empirically true), this justification provides an
extremely weak, if not embarrassing, basis for constitutional decision-
making. Preferring race-neutral. subsidies because the racial motivation is
less visible violates Kant's publicity principle that "[all actions relating to
the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is incompatible
with publicity."'" While the Supreme Court at times has countenanced
legislative or executive secrecy to further compelling government inter-
ests,42 this would be the only time that the Constitution preferred or even
required legislative opaqueness.43
Indeed, a particularly cynical extension of this argument would infer
that the Supreme Court in Croson/Adarand was counseling legislatures not
to explicitly discuss remedying past discrimination. Under this reading, the
Court would in effect be telling legislatures: If you stop talking about reme-
dying past discrimination, we will allow you to pass race-neutral subsidies
that disproportionately favor minorities.
Cynical or not, the argument from opaqueness flatly contradicts Justice
O'Connor's own classic statement of the process justification for strict
scrutiny:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such
race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what
classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are
41. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2648
(1995) (quoting a slightly altered translaiion of IMMANUEL KANT, KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS
126 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970)).
42. As David Luban cogently explains:
Th[e] publicity principle lies at the core of democratic political morality. Although the
principle has exceptions because political morality cannot dispense with all forms of
secrecy and confidentiality, these exceptions are themselves governed by the publicity
principle. That is, awarding officials the discretion to keep secrets or grant confiden-
tiality is itself a policy that should be able to withstand public scrutiny.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also David Luban, The Publicity Principle, in THE THEORY OF
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (Robert E. Goodin ed., 1996).
43. However, as discussed below, another example might be Justice Powell's preference for
Harvard's ambiguously defined plus-factor admissions program. See infra note 65 and accompany-
ing text.
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in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or sim-
ple racial politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke
out" illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool.
4
Attempts to shield the citizenry from legislators' race consciousness are
bound to shield the Court as well. Whether intended or not, Adarand and
Croson are bound to induce legislatures to conceal their race-conscious
decisionmaking behind race-neutral classifications. Perversely, the net
effect of these cases may be to subject racially motivated legislation to less
scrutiny than under the more lenient Metro Broadcasting standard
45
because the Court will have more difficulty determining for which statutes
race played a predominant motivating factor. It would be less burdensome
to the equal protection rights of non-beneficiaries to force racially
motivated policies into the open, where they can be more readily scruti-
44. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Justice O'Connor's concern about identifying subsidies that
are merely the by-product of racial politics (and are not therefore necessarily connected to a
legitimate constitutional interest) might suggest another reason why race-neutral means might be
preferable to explicit racial classifications: namely, the possibility that subsidies motivated by
"simple racial politics" are more likely to take the form of explicit racial classifications. How-
ever, there is little theoretical or empirical reason to think that prohibiting racial classifications
would retard impermissible political motivations more than it would permissible remedial motiva-
tions. Indeed, lowering the scrutiny for racially motivated subsidies that employ race-neutral
proxies may spark an increase in illegitimate interest-group politicking divorced from legitimate
remedial concerns.
It should be mentioned, however briefly, that simple racial politics has at times been an
essential device for securing remedial relief. The mere fact that a well-organized racial group,
such as the NAACP, petitions government by lobbying and casting its own votes for preferential
treatment does not by itself indicate whether the preferences are appropriately remedial.
45. In Metro Broadcasting, the Court used the less demanding "intermediate level" review,
not strict scrutiny, in judging whether congressional action violates the equal protection rights of
whites; "[A] congressionally mandated, benign, race-conscious program that is substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest is consistent with equal protec-
tion principles so long as it does not impose undue burdens on non-minorities." Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596-97 (1990) (emphasis omitted), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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nized by the courts and by the democratic process. 4" Racially motivated
legislation is inherently suspect, but unacknowledged racial motivation by
legislatures is all the more worrisome.
B. Avoiding Individual Racial Determinations
The second potential justification deserves more serious consideration.
It is possible that race-neutral means induce less racial divisiveness (and are
therefore "less restrictive alternatives") because they do not involve the
government in individual determinations of race. Justice Stevens first gave
voice to this concern in his dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick:
[T]he very attempt to define with precision a beneficiary's qualifying
racial characteristics is repugnant to our constitutional ideals .... If
the National Government is to make a serious effort to define racial
classes by criteria that can be administered objectively, it must study
precedents such as the First Regulation to the Reich's Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935 . . .7
Justice Stevens's concern was later echoed and expanded by Justice
Kennedy in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC:"
The Court fails to address the difficulties, both practical and
constitutional, with the task of defining members of racial groups
that its decision will require. The Commission, for example, has
found it necessary to trace an applicant's family history to 1492 to
46. Contrary to Adarand and Croson, this argument might suggest that the Supreme Court
should subject race-neutral classifications to even more intense scrutiny whenever the Court has
an inkling that the legislature had an unarticulated racial motive.
The Supreme Court has established "clear statement" rules with regard to some issues of
federal preemption. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1655 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("In the absence of a clear statement of congressional design ... we have refused to
interpret ambiguous federal statutes to limit fundamental state legislative prerogatives."); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64 (1991). Similarly, the Court might require more
forthright statements of race consciousness, so that such legislation would be subject to a truly
searching inquiry.
Subjecting facially neutral, but racially motivated statutes to stricter scrutiny might create an
"information forcing" effect. See Ian Ayres & Robert Germer, Filling in Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027,
1032 (1995); Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More: Overextraction and the Puzzle of
Immoderate Group Liability, 81 VA. L. REV. 1561, 1561-65 (1995).
47. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534 n.5 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
48. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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conclude that the applicant was "Hispanic" for purposes of a
minority tax certificate policy.
49
Race-neutral means to increase minority participation still force the govern-
ment to determine the racial characteristics of groups, but do not expose
society to the intrusive painful process of defining the race of individual
citizens: Determining that a particular neighborhood is predominantly
Latino or Anglo may be much easier than determining whether any particu-
lar person is Anglo or Latino.
50
Determinations of race that turn on how individuals label themselves
have led in the past to at least a few instances where individuals claimed
minority status merely to qualify for an affirmative action benefit.5'
While determining the racial characteristics of larger classes might also turn
in part on self-labeling (such as contained in census data), groups would
have much greater difficulty coordinating false claims of minority status to
qualify for benefits.
49. Id. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). While Justice Kennedy's concern with the
practical problems of defining race is legitimate, his characterization that the FCC "found it
necessary to trace an applicant's family history to 1492 to conclude that the applicant was 'His-
panic"' borders on the disingenuous. See also RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 544 (4th ed. 1993) (the Liberman family "qualified as Hispanic because
they traced their family to Jews whom the King had expelled from Spain in 1492. If you assume
20 years to a generation, there were over 24 generations from 1492 to the [present]. That means
that Mr. Liberman was as closely related to 16,777,216 ancestors."). In the case that Justice
Kennedy relies upon, the family's Spanish emigration in 1492 probably played a very small role in
the FCC's decision. The FCC found that the firm owners Adolfo Liberman and his sons Jose,
Elias, and Julio were "regarded by both themselves and their community as being Hispanic."
Their native language was Spanish, which "they still speak a majority of the time." The family
members had lived together in Mexico, Guatemala, and Costa Rica before coming to the United
States and becoming naturalized citizens. In re Storer Broadcasting Co., 87 F.C.C.2d 190, 190
(1981).
50. Analogous arguments about the intrusiveness of making individualized factual inquiries
were provided in Walter Dellinger's and Gene B. Sperling's discussion of the rape exception to
laws criminalizing abortion:
With a "rape exception," [a victim would need to] prove that she was "in fact" raped;
often a difficult task. Proving rape, though, would only be the beginning. Under the
theory of the rape exception, a woman would be entitled to an abortion only if she
could also prove that her pregnancy resulted from the rape and not from some other act
of sexual intercourse. The privacy sacrifice in such a situation constitutes an additional
argument against a statute that limits the permissible grounds for an abortion. Those
hostile to all abortions are likely to seek appointment to committees that would decide
these questions. In such a case, choice could be replaced by cross-examination.
Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v.
Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 107 n.82 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
51. See Taking Advantage: Some Pose as Members of Minority Groups to Promote Careers,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1991, at Al, A5; see also ROTUNDA, supra note 49, at 544; Daniel
Seligman, Only in America, FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1991, at 107.
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Our visceral reaction against laws that define race undergirds a coher-
ent justification for the Supreme Court's preference for race-neutral subsi-
dies. Far from requiring a narrowly tailored class of beneficiaries, the
Constitution might require using imprecise (poorly tailored) proxies for
racial discrimination. Even if the general populace knows the remedial
motivation for the subsidies, race-neutral means might avoid what Justices
Stevens and Kennedy consider to be the abhorrent process of determining
the race of individuals.
While this provides a coherent justification, it is not ultimately persua-
sive. Racial classification need not turn on the arcane measures of consan-
guinity used in the Nuremberg laws,52 South Africa's Apartheid,53 or our
own Jim Crow regimes. 54 Instead, section 8(d) of the Small Business Act
wisely defines "social disadvantage" as being "subjected to racial or ethnic
prejudice or cultural bias because of their identity as a member of a group
without regard to individual qualities."" Defining an individual's race
from a viewer's perspective at once tailors the definition to the remedial
goal of helping those that have been subject to disparate treatment without
denying that race is "socially constructed. ' 56  As Henry Louis Gates has
observed: "To declare that race is a trope, is to deny its palpable force in
the life of every African American who tries to function every day in a still
very racist America."' I7 Defining an individual's race by making infer-
52. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 535 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 633 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
54. See Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia,
1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 371, 395 (1994) ("The legal definition of a white person in
nineteenth-century Virginia required that a person have less than one-fourth African ances-
try....").
55. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (Supp. 1996).
56. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994); see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 3 (1996).
57. HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS 147
(1992).
[To those that suggest that race does not exist], Houston Baker demands that we remem-
ber what we might characterize as the "taxi fallacy." Houston, Anthony, and I emerge
from the splendid isolation of the Schomberg Library and stand together on the corner of
135th Street and Malcolm X Boulevard attempting to hail a taxi to return to the Yale
Club. With the taxis shooting by us as if we did not exist, Anthony and I cry out in
perplexity, "But sir, it's only a trope."
Id., quoted in Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855,
860 (1995).
And repeated testing in a variety of retail contexts indicates that the taxi example is not
merely hypothetical storytelling. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination
in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991); Prime Time Live: True Colors (ABC
television broadcast, Nov. 26, 1992) (filming discrimination faced by a well-dressed African
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ences (or possibly requiring evidence) about whether she was exposed to
disparate treatment should not raise the same constitutional concerns.
As an empirical matter, the vast majority of people claiming affirma-
tive action subsidies on the basis of self-reported minority status are bona
fide under this standard in that they have been subjected to systematic
disparate treatment because of their perceived minority status." While
hard cases of fraudulent or undeserving claims of minority status exist, they
are by comparison statistical aberrations. The current stability of racial
identity is empirically contingent,59 but the difficulty posed by making
determinations in hypothetical cases is not a sufficient "case in contro-
versy" to justify the Supreme Court's strong preference for race-neutral
means.
In sum, avoiding individual determinations of race represents the
strongest justification for preferring race-neutral subsidies, but such a gain
comes at the certain expense of poorer tailoring and the very probable
expense of less-candid lawmaking and, therefore, less-exacting scrutiny.
Richard Fallon notes in his contribution to this Symposium:
[lt is at least oddly disparate to maintain, on the one hand, that
explicitly race-conscious reasoning is permissible in justifying an
economically based affirmative action program, but to insist, on the
other, that race-consciousness is an evil that may not be reflected in
an affirmative action program's distributive criteria.6°
This section has attempted to unpack this odd disparity. When the govern-
ment's compelling interest is to remedy racial discrimination, the over-
inclusion prohibition of Croson inescapably points toward explicit racial
classifications. Although the Supreme Court seems to have a "least restric-
tive alternative" principle behind its preference for race-neutral means, this
section has shown that, properly understood, explicit racial classifications
American in dealing with a landlord and several retail merchants). See generally ELLIS COSE, THE
RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (describing the pervasive discrimination encountered by
middle-class African Americans).
58. To personally verify this admittedly unsupported assertion, ask yourself how many of the
self-identified minority students at your own school have not been exposed to unfavorable dispa-
rate treatment because of their perceived race.
59. See Jane Gross, Identity Key Issue of New Multiracial Movement; Diversity: Growing Mixed-
Race Population Seeks Recognition and a More Inclusive Way to Define Ourselves, L.A. TIMES
(Orange County), Jan. 14, 1996, at A16, A17; Vincent J. Schodolski, Mixed-Race Americans Feel
Boxed in by Forms: Effort Under Way to Change How Racial Questions Are Dealt with in 2000
Census, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 14, 1996, § 1, at 8; see also STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF
MAN (1981).
60. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1949-50.
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do not necessarily burden fundamental rights more than "race-neutral
means to increase minority participation."
II. QUOTAS VS. CREDITS
The United States insists that Japan commit itself to a clearly stated
increase in the number of dealers handling American cars and that
the two sides measure the progress annually. Japan has rejected that
approach as a use of "numerical targets" and managed trade.
6'
The front page of the June 28, 1995, New York Times was remarkable
because in adjacent articles the Clinton administration advanced seemingly
contradictory arguments on the equity of quotas. In discussing the looming
trade war with Japan, the administration argued that Japan had systemati-
cally discriminated against United States automobile imports and
demanded that the Japanese government agree to import explicit numeric
quotas. But in another article discussing the administration's review of
federal affirmative action, President Clinton reiterated that he was against
quotas. When the United States has been the victim of long-standing,
systematic discrimination, quotas seem to be the only credible remedy:
Assurances from the Japanese that they would stop discriminating against,
and even start implementing, U.S. import preferences rang hollow. But
when the United States was placed in the role of dismantling a history of
past discrimination, quotas seemed unduly burdensome. The moral of these
newspaper stories is that, from a victim's perspective, quotas do not seem so
inequitable.
The purpose of this section is to show that something close to quotas
might be consistent with-and possibly even required by-the narrow tailor-
ing principle. This section builds upon the last in that the reader is now
asked to accept that the government has established a compelling interest
and that explicit racial preferences are permissible. 62 Given this premise,
this section asks what form the racial preferences should take.
The central question I seek to answer is whether quotas or credits are
more consistent with narrow tailoring. While the term "quota" has a fairly
precise common meaning, the term "credit" has been loosely interchange-
able with the terms "plus-factor," "plus," or, most generically, "preference."
61. David E. Sanger, U.S. Officials Say Japan Eases a Bit on Trade Stance, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 1995, at Al, D4.
62. Explicit racial preferences might be permissible-even if the analysis of the prior section
is rejected-if race-neutral means were found to be ineffective.
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By quotas, I mean a preference that only allows minorities to compete for
set-aside government benefits-such as guardrail contracts or broadcast
licenses or medical school slots. By credits, I mean a preference that forces
minorities to compete with whites for government benefits, but gives
minorities an advantage over similarly situated whites. A quota guarantees
the highest-ranking minority a benefit, while a credit does not.
But before considering directly the choice between quotas and credits,
it is useful to point out that both quotas and credits can be implemented by
rules or standards. 63 Beginning with Bakke, analysts have often conflated
these two dimensions by comparing a rule-like quota with a standard-like
credit. Thus, Justice Powell compares Davis' quota/rule with Harvard's
fuzzy plus-factor system-a classic credit/standard. But as illustrated in





Figure 1: Two Different Dimensions
on Which Affirmative Action Pro-
grams Differ
was at issue in Adarand, and Executive Order 11,246 might create a quota standard. 6
63. The classic example used to distinguish rules and standards is the rule-like requirement
to drive less than 40 miles per hour and the standard-like requirement to drive at safe speed. See
Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S.C.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1 (1993); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 69 (1983); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 559-62 (1992).
64. The executive order mandates numerical goals and timetables for meeting these goals
but is standard-like by not defining what turns on failure to meet the goals according to the time-
table. See Bernard E. Anderson, The Ebb and Flow of Enforcing Executive Order 11246, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 298 (Paper & Proceedings 1996); Lara Hudgins, Comment, Rethinking Affirmative
Action in the 1990s: Tailoring the Cure to Remedy the Disease, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 815, 819-20
(1995). A quota might be standard-like either because the exact number that needs to be set
aside is not known ex ante (for example a quota/standard might require setting aside for minori-
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While Powell tried to justify his preference for credits over quotas, he
did not explain his seeming preference for standards, as exemplified by his
praise for Harvard's fuzzy individualized admissions process where race is
used as merely one among many ambiguously weighted factors. 61 It is not
self-evident that using standards to implement racial preferences is worthy
of praise. Courts will have more difficulty scrutinizing whether fuzzy racial
preferences are narrowly tailored to achieve their goals. Unlike rules, stan-
dards by definition submerge the degree of preference. Although a rules
versus standards debate is not the focus of this section, rules might be more
consistent with narrow tailoring.66
A. Comparing Quotas and Simple Credits
This section compares quotas and simple credits (which create con-
stant marginal subsidies to increase minority participation). For example,
affirmative action programs that granted minority law school applicants a
constant number of points to their LSAT scores (or that granted employers
an invariant subsidy for each additional minority hired) would constitute
such a simple credit. The Appendix presents an economic model which
illustrates, for very particular assumptions, that quotas can be better tailored
to achieve the government's legitimate goals than simple credits. But
because economic models are so off-putting-especially in the civil rights
ties a reasonable number of benefits) or because the consequences of deviating from a numerical
goal are not known ex ante (as with the executive order).
65. Powell's insistence that race be one of several factors might make sense when the
government's compelling interest is furthering educational diversity. As Powell noted, "The
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses afar broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element."
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). But
requiring that race be one of multiple factors in granting a benefit is not similarly implied if the
government's compelling interest is remedying past discrimination. Extending procurement
subsidies to people who have suffered other types of social disadvantage does not further the
government's remedial interest.
66. Rule-like racial preferences would also allow legislatures to tailor the burdens of affirma-
tive action programs and, thus, might promote the least restrictive alternative analysis. For
example, if an admissions formula were more rule-like, it would be possible to identify and com-
pensate individuals who had been denied admission or government contract work because of their
race.
Tom Ulen suggested to me that standards might have an advantage in that they would be
easier to phase out in the future. This has proved useful to the Supreme Court in other civil
rights contexts. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) (redefining interdistrict
school desegregation remedy); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (redefin-
ing business necessity defense).
1802
HeinOnline -- 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1802 1995-1996
Narrow Tailoring 1803
context-this section describes the results of the model without graphs or
equations.
1. Trading Off Quantity and Quality Burdens
To decide whether a quota or credit is the "less restrictive alternative,"
it is important to see that the constitutional burden of a racial classification
is not solely captured by calculating the number of cases in which the racial
preference is dispositive; the disparity in quality between minority and non-
minority firms is also relevant.67  Allocating a given number of contracts
(or admission spots) to minorities is more burdensome to better qualified
non-minorities when the preference countenances substantial disparities in
quality. Reverting back to the meta-goal of minimizing racial divisiveness,
non-minorities have a more legitimate claim of unfair treatment if they lose
out to minorities who are substantially less qualified than to minorities who
are only slightly less qualified.6 To capture how much affirmative action
deviates from race-blind decisionmaking, it is accordingly necessary to
67. Because the "quality" of someone seeking a government benefit is almost always multi-
dimensional, ranking people competing for such benefits is often difficult or contestable. In the
academic context, for example, important questions exist regarding how to measure quality, and
many diversity proponents argue that minority applications do not need to be subsidized to win
admission if truer measures of ability were used. Instead of having minorities meet current stan-
dards of merit, critical race scholars have challenged the validity of traditional measures of ability.
See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67
CAL. L. REV. 3, 8 (1979) ("[Tlhere is impressive evidence that grades and test scores cannot
predict success in the practice of law or medicine."); Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical
Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1991) (stating that most critical race
scholars question objectivity of merit standards); Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections
on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 572 (1984) (advocating "an over-
haul of the admissions process and a rethinking of the criteria that make a person a deserving law
student and future lawyer" instead of affirmative action for law school admissions); Duncan
Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705,
707-12 (criticizing existing standards of merit as socially constructed and impossible to apply in a
colorblind fashion).
These arguments are seldom made, however, with regard to affirmative action in government
procurement. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume that the procurement contract ade-
quately assures uniformity on all aspects of performance, so that the government can cardinally
rank applicant/bidders by the price of their bid. Even though contract law does not in fact assure
full performance, it is only necessary that some metric exist that allows the government to estab-
lish a cardinal ranking.
68. The larger the government's deviation from race-blind decisionmaking, the stronger the
claim of the non-minorities who would have been allocated the benefit in the absence of the
affirmative action program. Such equitable claims are rooted in the presumption that merito-
cratic allocation generally enhances social welfare. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 1919. The
larger the deviation from meritocracy, the larger the government interest is needed to rebut the
presumption.
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measure not only the number of cases in which race is dispositive, but the
average disparity in quality when race is dispositive.69 In sum, both the
quantity (of minority participation induced by affirmative action) and the
quality (disparity between minorities and non-minorities) are constitution-
ally relevant.
A natural way to tailor affirmative action to minimize the divisive
burden of racial classification is to acknowledge a tradeoff between the
quantity-burden and quality-burden of affirmative action subsidies. A pro-
gram that granted minorities a forty percent bidding credit on five percent
of government contracts might be no more burdensome than one granting
minorities a five percent bidding credit on forty percent of government
contracts.70 Even though the forty percent bidding credit might effec-
tively operate as a set-aside (and impose a substantial quality burden),7' it
only forecloses non-minorities from five percent of the market: The quan-
tity burden-the number of contracts where race is dispositive-is much less
burdensome.
72
69. This approach does not constitutionalize a particular, narrow view of meritocracy as a
benchmark. Instead, government institutions are allowed great latitude in choosing among race-
blind benchmarks.
70. From behind a modified Rawlsian veil, it might not be clear which affirmative action
program non-minorities would favor. The particular ignorance at issue might concern the rela-
tive strength of minority bidders.
71. See infra note 84.
72. An extremely crude way of combining the two types of burdens would be to multiply
the quantity allocated because of a racial preference by the average quality disparity when race
was dispositive. While this specific multiplicative burden measure is only one of several ways of
trading off the two types of burden (and is not constitutionally required), performing this simple
calculation can be illuminating. For example, several commentators have claimed that affirma-
tive action in academic admissions has helped Caucasian women more than minorities. While it
might be that the gender of Caucasian women has been a decisive factor in a larger number of
slots than race has been for minority men and women, it is not clear that the total number of
SAT (or LSAT) credits given to Caucasian women has been greater than to minorities. Even if
the number of minority admissions due to race is relatively small, the constitutional burden is a
function not only of the number of slots foreclosed, but of the average disparity in quality.
Unfortunately, the recent Hopwood decision only provided partial information about the
quality burden. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
The court did identify combinations of GPAs and LSAT scores for which white applicants would
be presumptively rejected and for which black applicants would be presumptively admitted. Id. at
937. The court noted that to avoid being presumptively denied a white applicant with a 3.2
GPA would need to score in the top 32% of LSAT takers, while a black applicant with the same
GPA would need only to score within the top 80%. Id. at 937 n.8. While the facial difference
for this facet of the admissions program is substantial, the court reports nothing about the actual
difference in scores between those students who were admitted because of their race and those
who were rejected because of their race. (The table showing the median LSATs and GPAs for
admitted white and black students is hardly probative of whether the cutoffs countenanced too
great a disparity in quality (because infra-marginal white students may inflate the white median
result). See id. at 937 n.7.) Most importantly, the opinion contains almost no discussion of the
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If the quality disparity did not play an important role in assessing the
burden of an affirmative action program, then one might easily argue that
quotas are perfectly tailored. As long as the quota equals what minority
participation would be without discrimination, then non-minorities are not
foreclosed from competing for any contracts that they would have won
absent past discrimination. But the Court's antipathy for quotas stems at
least in part from the fact that quotas, by "insulating" minorities from non-
minority competition, can countenance arbitrarily large differences in
quality-and that racial differences in quality as well as the amount of
participation induced by racial preferences are relevant. In her Metro
Broadcasting dissent, Justice O'Connor has come closest to acknowledging
the relationship between the quantity and quality burdens:
The Court's emphasis on the multifactor process should not be
confused with the claim that the preference is in some sense a minor
one. It is not .... [R]ace is clearly the dispositive factor in a sub-
stantial percentage of comparative proceedings. 7
Justice O'Connor sees that the size of the racial preference ("dispositive
factor") as well as the number of cases ("substantial percentage") in which it
is dispositive are relevant to determining the burden imposed by the racial
classification. What is missing, however, is the crucial notion that the
Constitution can tolerate more of one burden if the affirmative action
program exhibits less of the other.
Recognizing this quantity-quality tradeoff provides a constitutional
underpinning for the rather intuitive notion that in a narrowly tailored
program, minority participation should be reduced when minority appli-
cants are relatively weak. If the quality disparity between minorities and
non-minorities is unexpectedly large, then the maximum quantity of con-
tracts (or admission slots) where race is dispositive should be lowered to
reduce the effective burden of the program. For example, even if the
government could establish that the minority share of procurement con-
tracts would be twenty percent without past discrimination, the Constitu-
tion might prohibit the use of twenty-five percent bidding credits to induce
quantity burden. The court reports, but does not rely upon, the plaintiffs' assertion that
"600-700 higher-scoring white residents were passed over before the first blacks were denied
admission." Id. at 937 n.9. This number tells us almost nothing about how many slots were
allocated because of race. Many of these so-called "passed over" whites may have lost out to
better qualified whites under a race-blind regime. Without assessing the quantity burden, it is
impossible to assess the constitutional burden imposed by the admissions program.
73. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
see Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1763 n.88.
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this participation rate; but it might countenance twenty-five percent
bidding credits if the credits were decisive in only five percent of the
bidding. In short, the "less restrictive alternative" requirement suggests
that the level of minority participation should be in part a function of the
strength of minority quality. While this section has shown that the less
restrictive alternative principle requires that affirmative action programs be
sensitive to both quantity and quality burdens on non-minorities, the next
two sections show that implementing racial preferences that trade off quan-
tity and quality burdens can also be better tailored to achieve the govern-
ment's remedial interest, and hence be more consonant with the narrow
tailoring principle.
2. The Impact of Quotas and Credits on the Government's Remedial
Interest
Credits seem to be "less restrictive alternatives" than quotas because,
with a quota, the level of minority participation is not sensitive to the rela-
tive quality of minorities competing for the benefit in question.74 Credits
seem to be more narrowly tailored-in the sense of minimizing the quantity
and quality burdens on non-minorities-because they allow flexibility on
just this dimension. For example, in a law school admissions program, if
minority applicants are relatively strong, a fixed LSAT credit will lead to
increased minority acceptances. Or for a construction program in which a
general contractor is given a fixed bonus for each additional minority con-
tractor, unexpectedly high minority bids will lead to reduced participation.
In each case, credits induce fluctuations in the level of minority participa-
tion that seem better tailored to the government's interest.
74. If the government knew the relative quality of minority and non-minority applicants, it
could always choose quotas that would induce the same quantity and quality burdens as a particu-
lar credit. See infra Appendix. But in many contexts, quotas are chosen before the government
has full information about the relative strength of applicants or bidders. When the government
must choose the type of racial preference ex ante (under such conditions of uncertainty), a quota
is not as sensitive to realized quality as a credit.
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But commentators have not realized that credits can induce too much
fluctuation: inducing too large a reaction to changes in relative minority
quality.75 While credits laudably harness the general contractors' self-
interest to reduce minority participation when minority bids are unex-
pectedly high, the general contractor is not a perfect agent in pursuing
governmental objectives.
The possible divergence of the government's interest in adjusting
minority participation to respond to the relative strength of minority bid-
ders and the general contractor's interest under a credit regime represents a
classic externality. If minority bids are unexpectedly strong, an invariant
credit might induce general contractors to overshoot-by increasing minor-
ity participation above the level it would be without discrimination. But
such a result would be inconsistent with narrow tailoring: The government
has no compelling remedial interest in causing minority participation to
exceed what it would be absent discrimination.
Analogously, if minority bids are unexpectedly weak, the general con-
tractor-in reducing minority participation-internalizes the foregone credit
subsidy but has no reason to consider the impact on the government's
remedial purpose. The government might have a particularly strong inter-
est in avoiding drastic shortfalls in minority participation: For example, one
might imagine markets in which failing to maintain a minimum market
share would undermine the long-term viability of all existing minority
businesses. Simple credits give private decisionmakers no reason to con-
sider how dramatic, short-term shortfalls in minority participation will
affect the government's long-term remedial interest.
In short, the government's remedial interest in inducing marginal
increases of minority participation is not constant, but simple credits give
decisionmakers constant marginal subsidies. The government's interest in
inducing "token" participation may be quite small, but assuring some criti-
75. Robert Cooter, in other contexts, has recognized that price incentives may give rise to
too much quantity variation. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523,
1531 (1984).
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cal mass of participation may be particularly important to achieving the
government's long-term remedial goal. Moreover, there are strong reasons
to think that the benefits of marginal increases in minority participation
must at some point decline toward zero. As far as the government's reme-
dial interest is concerned, there are likely to be diminishing returns to
increasing minority participation with racial preferences.76 Civil rights
advocates might worry that acknowledging diminishing returns understates
the government's interest in raising minority participation all the way to
what it would be absent discrimination. But the flipside of diminishing
benefits for increased minority participation is realizing that the govern-
ment has a heightened remedial interest in forestalling drastic shortfalls in
minority participation. Consider two markets where, without discrimina-
tion, minorities would have a forty-percent market share. Most civil rights
advocates would find it more valuable to raise minority participation in one
market from fifteen to twenty percent than it would be to increase partici-
pation in the other from thirty-five to forty percent.
But simple credits that grant a constant subsidy for marginal increases
in minority participation do not give decisionmakers incentive to internal-
ize this varying remedial interest. The crucial failure of simple credits,
then, is that they might overshoot the legitimate response to the varying
strength of minority bidders, countenancing large fluctuations in minority
participation. When a credit creates the possibility of large fluctuations in
minority participation and when there are significant social harms from
large or small levels of participation, the fluctuations in participation
caused by the credits might be more poorly tailored than the invariant
participation caused by quotas. The Appendix shows this possibility for
very specific assumptions, but the intuition is much broader: If credits do
not give private decisionmakers incentive to choose the correct level of
minority participation, then delegating this decisionmaking via a credit
program may be more poorly tailored to achieve the government's interest
than using a quota to mandate an invariant level of participation.
B. Declining-Credit Schedules
Let me be quick to emphasize that quotas are not perfectly tailored. A
more enlightened choice than quotas or simple credits is to establish a
declining-credit schedule that conditions the size of the credit on the quan-
tity of minority representation. The goal would be to set the credit sched-
76. This diminishing marginal returns argument is formalized below in the Appendix.
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ule to approximate the government's actual interest in marginal increases
in participation. Instead of granting minorities a ten percent bidding credit
for all procurement contracts, a credit schedule might create the incentives
depicted in Table 1:
Bidding Disparity Maximum
Between Minority and Minority
Non-Minority Bidders Market Share
a 15% credit for 5% 10%-15% 5%
of the contracts
a 10% credit for 20% 5% - 10% 25%
of the contracts
a 5% credit for 5% of 0%-5% 30%
the contracts
a 0% credit for 70% < 0% 100%
of the contracts
Table 1: Example of Declining-Credit Schedule
The next section will say more about how these percentages might be cal-
culated, but for now it is only important to see that the declining-credit
schedule still allows the strength of minority bids to affect the degree of
participation: If minority bids are less than five percent above non-minority
bids, the minority market share can be as high as thirty percent; but if
minority bids are more than ten percent above non-minority bids, minority
participation falls to at least five percent. The key to a declining-credit
schedule is that the larger the disparity in quality (measured here by the size
of the bid),77 the smaller the minority market share.
Creating a credit schedule that more closely tracks the government's
remedial interest would mitigate the externality problem of simple credits:
The declining-credit schedule would cause the general contractor to inter-
nalize the welfare costs associated with foregone minority participation.
Regardless of whether the minority bidders placed unexpectedly high or low
bids, the general contractor facing a credit schedule would have a better
incentive to adjust participation without over- or under-shooting.
77. See supra note 74 (discussing quality).
Narrow Tailoring 1809
HeinOnline -- 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1809 1995-1996
To implement a declining-credit schedule, it Would not be necessary
that all the procurement contracts be bid simultaneously or that the con-
tracts with the highest minority credit be bid first. For example, to imple-
ment the declining-credit schedule, a government procurement agency
could announce that it would award all contracts to low bidders, but that at
year's end, minority bidders (who had won contracts) would be eligible for a
bonus. The size of this year-end bonus would be a function of the minority
market share of total procurement dollars. For example, the declining-
credit schedule depicted in Table 1 would pay prevailing minorities fifteen
percent more than their nominal bids if minorities won less then five per-
cent of the procurement contracts, but only a ten percent bonus if the
minority market share was between five percent and twenty-five percent,
and no bonus if the minority market share was more than thirty percent.7"
Indeed, the simplest way to create a declining-credit effect would be
for a procurement agency to announce that winning minority bidders in a
given fiscal period would share pro-rata in a fixed bonus. If several minor-
ity contractors prevailed, a fixed bonus split several ways would amount to a
small bidding credit; but if relatively few minority contractors prevailed, the
fixed bonus would be substantially higher.79
This fixed-bonus method not only might better trade the government's
remedial interest but also naturally trades off the quantity and quality bur-
dens described above:' Dividing a fixed bonus pro-rata among minorities
could ensure that there would only be large disparities in quality (measured,
as before, by price) when there is a relatively small quantity of the market
being allocated on the basis of race. (And, conversely, race would only be
decisive for a larger market share if the average quality difference was rela-
tively small.) Fixed bonuses also have affinities with cumulative voting.
Just as cumulative voting allows minority shareholders to cumulate their
votes on a few candidates to ensure some minimum level of representation,
78. Such a bonus system would force minorities to bear some risk about what the size of the
bonus would be, and hence might not encourage as much participation as bidding credits that
were known ex ante. One might expect risk-averse minorities to bid more aggressively toward
the end of the fiscal period when there is better information on the size of the bonus.
79. Of course, it would be possible for the procurement agency to stipulate that under no
circumstance would the bonus paid to an individual firm be above some maximum percentage of
its nominal bid-to remove the possibility that a firm would be paid an unconscionably large
bonus. The possibility of such dramatic bonuses is remote, however, because minority firms on
other contracts would normally reduce their bids to share in the bonus. Alternatively, the pro-
curement agency might make the size of next year's bonus conditional on the minority market
share of procurement in the past fiscal period.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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fixed bonuses allow the government procurement office to cumulate its
remedial effort to assure the maximum amount of minority participation,
while assuring that the total quantity and quality burdens to non-minorities
would in no event be greater than a predetermined number of dollars. And
as Peter Cramton and I have shown elsewhere, the cost to government of
distributing such fixed bonuses is almost certainly less than the face value of
the bonus-as these ex post bidding credits can induce more competition
and induce non-preferred firms to bid more competitively.
8 1
Several affirmative action programs currently implement a type of
declining-credit schedules. For example, in a recent auction of (narrow-
band) paging licenses, the FCC granted what amounted to a 50% bidding
credit for 12.5% of the licenses; a 16% bidding credit for 25%; and 0% for
the remaining 62.5%. 2 Moreover, the affirmative action program at issue
in Adarand itself exhibited a kind of varying credit schedule: A maximum
subsidy equaling 1.5% of the general contract could be earned for hiring
one minority subcontractor, but only 0.5% more could be earned for hiring
a second minority subcontractor, and no additional subsidy was offered for
hiring more than two minority subcontractors.
8 3
Moreover, implicit credit schedules lie behind many of the admission
programs that grant minority applicants preferences. Few programs would
give minorities an invariant credit. Imagine, for example, a college wishing
to admit one thousand applicants almost exclusively on the basis of SAT
scores-but with a preference for racial minorities. Even if a ten percentile
credit had been sufficient to admit one hundred minority students in recent
years, admissions directors would inevitably make this credit sensitive to
the relative strength of minority applications in a given year. For example,
in a particular year, if the ten percentile credit would only succeed in ad-
mitting eight minorities instead of the usual one hundred, I predict that
most admissions offices would in effect increase the credit to admit a few
more minority applicants. Conversely, if a ten percentile credit succeeded
too well by admitting four hundred minorities, I predict that most admis-
sions offices would decrease the minority preference. Thus, if we pierce the
veil of standard-like affirmative action programs to discover the underlying
rule-like formula, we are likely to find that the de facto credit is implicitly a
81. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 10 (showing that bidding credits can even reduce the
budget deficit).
82. See id.
83. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104 (1995).
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function of the degree of minority participation. Far from being bad, the
foregoing analysis suggests that conditioning the size of a minority prefer-
ence on the quantity of minority participation is generically the most
tailored means. Countenancing larger preferences when minority participa-
tion is low better tailors the means to the government's legitimate interests
without increasing the burden on non-minorities, because the larger dispar-
ity in quality is offset by the smaller quantity of minority beneficiaries.
C. Quasi-Quotas
Credit schedules might, however, be criticized for creating quasi-
quotas. For example, granting minorities a fifty-percent bidding credit for a
small number of FCC paging licenses effectively set-aside those licenses-
insulating preferred bidders from non-minority competition. Granting
substantial bidding credits to ensure at least small amounts of minority
participation can, however, still be defended on narrow tailoring (and least
restrictive alternative) grounds for four reasons.
First, unlike an absolute quota, by assuring a minimum level of minor-
ity quality, a quasi-quota would at least to a small degree tailor the level of
participation to the strength of minority applicants. A fifty-percent bidding
credit, unlike a set-aside, does not absolutely guarantee that the benefit will
be allocated to a minority. While it is unlikely that minority bidders will
be so weak that they cannot prevail, the substantial credit-as opposed to
an absolute set-aside-provides some assurance that prevailing minorities
must have minimal qualifications. Moreover, a substantial bidding credit is
more readily subject to strict scrutiny than a quota. A quasi-quota states
directly how much of a quality disparity the government is willing to toler-
ate (for example, how much of a cost difference) to assure a minimum level
of minority participation. The absolute quota does not directly "price" the
government's interest, or if it does, it implausibly implies that ensuring
minority participation is worth any burden on non-minorities. However,
many racial preferences which seem to be absolute set-asides already have
built-in limited amounts of interrace competition. For example, both sec-
1812 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
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tion 8(a) 4 and the dreaded "Rule of Two"85 allow minority set-asides
only if the procurement officer certifies that minority bids will not be more
than ten percent above non-minority bids.
Second, a quasi-quota would only be appropriate if the government
found that shortfalls in participation below some minimum level would
seriously undermine its remedial effort.86 To justify a quasi-quota, the
government would need to do more than simply establish its overall remed-
ial goal: the level of minority participation that would have developed
absent discrimination.8 7 The secondary showing would likely focus on the
84. The "8(a) program" derives from § 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)
(1994), which requires the Small Business Association to enter into contracts with other federal
agencies and arrange for the performance of those contracts with socially and economically disad-
vantaged small business concerns. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-355, § 7102, 108 Stat. 3243, 3368 (authorizing civilian agencies to implement a program
similar to the Department of Defense Small Disadvantaged Business program). The Department
of Defense SDB program requires setting aside all contracts where there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of receiving two or more offers from SDBs, if the award will be made at no more than 10%
above fair market price. 48 C.F.R. § 219.5 (1995).
85. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 219.506(a), 55 Fed. Reg. 36280
(1991) (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 219.506(a)).
According to the rule of two, a contracting officer must set-aside an acquisition exclu-
sively for small disadvantaged business participation when a reasonable expectation exists
that there will be offers received from at least two responsible [small disadvantaged busi-
nesses] who will offer the goods or services requested at a price that does not exceed ten
percent of the fair market price. A solicitation exclusively set aside for small disadvan-
taged business participation could not be withdrawn by the contracting agency unless the
set-aside was inappropriate or the low, responsive, and responsible offeror submitted a
price which exceeded the fair market price plus a ten percent ceiling.
Danielle Conway-Jones & Christopher Leon Jones, Jr., Department of Defense Procurement
Practices After Adarand: What Lies Ahead for the Largest Purchaser of Goods and Services and Its
Base of Small Disadvantaged Business Contractors, 39 How. L.J. 391, 399 (1995).
86. Professor (now Solicitor General) Drew Days suggested analogously that the set-asides
included in the Public Works Employment Act were appropriate because government did not
have the opportunity to calculate the appropriate credit size that would have helped ensure that
minimal participation by minority businesses. Days, supra note 7, at 456 (The "fast-moving
nature of the 1976 and 1977 public works programs justified the set-aside. Without some safe-
guard for minority businesses, the federal funding might have disappeared before corrective
measures for discriminatory practices could be undertaken." (citing Brief for the Secretary of
Commerce at 42, Fullilove v. Klutmick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (No. 78-1007))).
87. See infra at note 92 (describing how the overall benchmark is calculated).
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long-term impact of a dramatic shortfall in minority participation far below
the ultimate goal. For example, evidence about the "minimum efficient
scale" of production and technological "learning curves" might suggest that
a shortfall would threaten a remedy's long-term success-by threatening the
viability of minority contractors in the process of establishing themselves as
self-sufficient competitors. In such' circumstances, a quasi-quota would be
better tailored because it would cause decisionmakers to better internalize
the true social costs of dramatic shortfalls in minority participation.
Third, because a quasi-quota would only set aside a fraction of the
government's legitimate remedial goal, it would impose a smaller burden on
the interests of non-beneficiaries. As discussed above, in estimating the
burden of an affirmative action plan on non-minorities, there is a tradeoff
between the quantity of slots allocated because of race and the quality of
the disparity between minorities and non-minorities when race is disposi-
tive. A quasi-quota by definition imposes a larger quality-burden, but
because it applies to a fraction of the government's overall goal, the quan-
tity burden on non-minorities is relatively small. Non-minorities are practi-
cally foreclosed from a portion of the market, but the non-minority share is
still much larger than it would be without discrimination. Creating quasi-
quotas to meet the government's entire remedial goal would not be nar-
rowly tailored. But substantial bidding credits, which create what I have
called quasi-quotas, constitute the least restrictive way of forestalling against
the negative remedial consequences of a dramatic shortfall in minority
participation. For example, if the government demonstrated that absent
past or ongoing discrimination, minorities would provide thirty percent of
procurement contracts, it might be appropriate to create quasi-quotas for
five percent or ten percent of the procurement dollars, but it would not be
narrowly tailored to effectively set aside twenty-five percent or thirty per-
cent of the procurement dollars.
Finally, granting minority enterprises effective guarantees of minimum
participation can increase the quality of minority participants, so as to
reduce the disparity between minority and non-minority recipients.
8 8
Offering minorities a "safety-net" can enhance the quality of minority
participation and increase the quality of minority applicants/bidders. For
example, a law school that guarantees that it would accept up to a fifty
88. Just as guaranteeing a critical mass of admitted minorities may stimulate the strength of
minority applications, effectively guaranteeing a minimum amount of minority contracting may
stimulate sufficient minority participation to bid away the effects of a substantial racial credit.
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percentile difference in LSAT scores if it is necessary to admit five percent
minorities might induce a much stronger pool of minority applicants (if
minorities want to minimize the risk of going to a school where they will be
a token presence). Effectively guaranteeing at least five percent participa-
tion may allow the school to increase minority participation with a much
smaller LSAT credit. The reverse of this "herding" effect is occurring now
in University of California schools. The Regents' directive that race not be
used as an admissions criterion-even though not effective until 1998-has
already caused a substantial decline in minority admissions.89
The usefulness of quasi-quotas in strengthening minority quality is not
limited to educational contexts where non-economic motives abound and
where minority applicants see their participation as complementary. The
strongest evidence can be found in recent FCC paging auctions. In a
regional narrowband auction of thirty licenses, the FCC granted designated
entities (that is, minority- and female-controlled firms) what amounted to a
fifty-percent bidding credit for ten of the licenses and a sixteen-percent
bidding credit on the remaining twenty licenses. The fifty-percent bidding
credit-by virtually assuring that at least ten licenses would go to "desig-
nated" firms-very likely induced a number of minority and female busi-
nesses to form. Knowing that there were at least ten licenses effectively set
aside may have induced designated firms to undertake the fixed costs to
organize, investigate, and finance. In this narrowband auction, the guaran-
tee was so effective in inducing minority- (and female-) controlled firms to
form that the designated entities bid away forty percent of the bidding
credit on the set-aside licenses (meaning the nominal bids on the ten safety-
net licenses were forty-percent higher than those paid by non-preferred
firms for similar licenses), and a designated entity even ended up winning
one of the licenses where only the sixteen-percent bidding credit obtained.
There is an important lesson here. The government can offer very
substantial bidding credits to ensure minimal minority participation often
without bearing the constitutional burden of large disparities in quality (or
89. 1 was told about this precipitous decline in admissions after my Symposium presentation
by an administrator of the UCLA undergraduate admissions office. Prospective minority students
worried that there will not be as large a minority cohort at California schools have started apply-
ing to colleges and universities outside the California system. Even if the recent holding of
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), that "[a]ny
consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student
body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment," were accepted by the
Supreme Court, this "minority flight" might continue to non-governmental institutions that are
not bound by the Equal Protection Clause requirements.
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price). Guaranteeing a minimum amount of participation may induce
stronger designated firms to form so that, in the end, the government need
not pay off on the guarantee. Perversely, guaranteeing a very substantial
subsidy for a minimum amount of participation may actually reduce the
racial disparity that is needed to achieve the government's remedial goal.
Even though quasi-quotas might seem to violate the spirit of Bakke's
prohibition against quotas,9° this subsection has shown that substantial
racial preferences which virtually insulate minority bidders or applicants
from competition are consistent with-and might be required by-the nar-
row tailoring and least restrictive alternative principles. Upon a showing
that dramatic shortfalls in minority participation (from what it would be
without discrimination) would substantially impede the government's reme-
dial effort, and especially upon a showing that a quasi-quota would likely
enhance minority participation, 91 the government would be justified in
establishing substantial bidding credits to assure a small proportion of its
overall remedial goal.
The take-home lessons of Part II have been threefold:
(1) Invariant credits may be less narrowly tailored than a quota
to further the government's remedial objective because they may
induce too much fluctuation in minority participation.
(2) Declining-credit schedules that grant larger racial preferences
the larger the shortfall in minority participation (from what it
would be absent discrimination) are most consistent with the
narrow tailoring and less restrictive alternative -principles.
Declining-credit schedules are better tailored to the government's
remedial interest, and countenancing a larger quality disparity for
90. Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1763 n.88.
91. Historical evidence that minority applicants had bid away the lion's share of quasi-
quotas in the past, or in analogous markets, would be strong evidence that the quasi-quota is not
as burdensome as its facial appearance. At a minimum this type of evidence might show that the
quasi-quota is akin to a 30-year flood levy which is likely to be tested in only rare instances.
Moreover, comparisons among institutions with and without quasi-quotas might provide more
affirmative evidence that substantial bidding credits for a small fraction of the market can
enhance minority quality and participation. Courts need to be very cautious about facial scrutiny
of such substantial credits. If a 5% bidding credit for 20% of procurement contracts would pass
constitutional muster, it is possible that granting a 30% bidding credit for just 5% of procurement
contracts will induce enough minority firms to form that one could expect a constitutionally
permissible equilibrium (that is, a 5% quality disparity and a 20% minority participation).
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a smaller quantity of government benefits can be a less restrictive
alternative.
(3) ,A narrowly tailored credit schedule may attempt to achieve a
* small fraction of the government's legitimate remedial goal with
bidding credits so, substantial that they effectively set aside some
* government benefits.
While the foregoing analysis is theoretically coherent, the next section
explores the difficulty of creating a declining-credit schedule in practice.
III. TAILORING THE SCOPE OF RACIAL PREFERENCES
IN THE REAL WORLD
In contrast to the top-down doctrinal and economic analysis of the
first two sections, this section works from the bottom up-looking at the
kinds of data currently used to justify remedial affirmative action pro-
grams-to see how a declining-credit schedule might be implemented. The
declining-credit curve is meant to approximate the government's remedial
benefit from marginal increases in minority participation. Calculating such
a curve is a daunting task. There is little social consensus whether there
are any remedial benefits to race-conscious remedies. It blinks reality to
think that the government could calculate numeric credits that precisely
capture its remedial interest.
In the absence of precision, how might.the government proceed? As a
first step, one might retain the current method of assessing what minority
participation would have been without discrimination. -Calculating this
market share would at least pin down one end of the credit schedule by
establishing the participation level at which bidding credits should end. A
number of states have conducted post.Croson studies estimating what the
participation of minorities would be in particular markets absent discrimina-
tion. While this benchmark provides some evidence of the minority parti-
cipation level where the credit schedule should phase out, it does not help
estimate how steeply a narrowly tailored credit schedule should slope. This
section first discusses the "state of the art" in calculating the overall reme-
dial goal-what the minority market share would be without discrimina-
tion-and then speculates what types of evidence might be brought to bear
in setting the size of bidding credits to encourage lower levels of parti-
cipation.
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A. Estimating the Overall Remedial Goal
The current "state of the art" is extremely crude. 92 In recent post-
Croson disparity studies, the minority business market share absent discrimi-
nation has been estimated in two stages.93 In the first stage, the number
of minimally qualified minority firms is divided by the total number of mini-
mally qualified firms. Much turns on how one defines "minimally quali-
fied." In a New York study, firms were labeled minimally qualified if they
appeared on "agency procurement 'bidders lists' which contain firms that
have either made themselves available to do business, or have actually done
business, with one or more agencies."' 94 This first-stage calculation yields
the minority percentage of firms who have attempted to bid. The second
stage then adjusts this percentage to account for the possibility that more
minority firms would have been available to bid absent discrimination. To
make this "but-for discrimination" adjustment, the studies calculate a
regression to determine how much more likely it is that non-minorities with
similar educational and work will be entrepreneurs. 95
In the New York disparity study, minority business enterprises consti-
tuted 11.6% of the bidders list. The "but-for discrimination" regression
suggested that there would have been twenty percent more minority firms
92. The studies have been inspired by Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Croson that
"[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority con-
tractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors actu-
ally engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory
exclusion could arise." City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
93. For a detailed discussion of one of the more sophisticated disparity studies, see Hyman
Frankel, Opportunity Denied!: New York State's Study of Racial and Sexual Discrimination Related to
Government Contracting, 26 URB. LAW. 413 (1994). For a list of publicly available disparity stud-
ies kept by the Project on Civil Rights and Public Contracts of the University of Maryland Grad-
uate School, see Prepared Testimony of George R. La Noue Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Federalism, and Property of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 22, 1995),
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Federal News Service File.
94. Frankel, supra note 93, at 427.
95. The regression calculates what types of educational and work experience lead non-
minorities to become entrepreneurs and then estimates how many minority entrepreneurs would
exist, given their current experiences, if these experiences had the probabilistic effect on minori-
ties. See George R. La Noue & John Sullivan, "But For" Discrimination: How Many Minority-
Owned Businesses Would There Be?, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (Winter 1992).
Of course, it is possible that societal discrimination caused minorities to be less likely to
obtain certain types of educational experience. But consistent with Croson's holding that affirma-
tive action could not be used to remedy these more general forms of discrimination, these but-for
estimates take preexisting differences in education as given. Frankel, supra note 93, at 429.
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absent discrimination 96-so that after adjustment, the percentage of minor-
ity bidders who would have existed absent discrimination is 13.9.' This
number is a crucial benchmark for establishing the government's overall
remedial goal. In New York, the minority market share of state procure-
ment dollars was only 5.8%. The disparity between the government's
estimate of what the minority market share would be without discrimina-
tion (availability: 13.9%) and what it currently was (utilization: 5.8%) estab-
lishes not only the government's compelling interest but illuminates
whether a particular affirmative action program is narrowly tailored to
achieve the 13.9% remedial goal.
However, this whole methodology is based on a fairly extreme assump-
tion that if 13.9% of the firms are minority-owned, these minority firms
would, absent discrimination, control 13.9% of the procurement revenues.
Courts have rejected head-counting-in that they have rejected using the
minority percentage in the general population as a benchmark of what
market share minorities would control without discrimination-but in its
stead, they have accepted a fairly crude method of firm-counting. The
assumption that existing minority firms would control a proportionate
market share absent discrimination heroically compares firms with radically
different capacities. In this calculus, a Fortune 500 firm is given the same
weight as a firm one-thousandth its size. Even though the disparity studies
label the first stage estimate as a measure of "availability," there is little or
no attempt to control for the capacity of existing firms. The methodology
is especially crude in a post-Croson, post.Adarand world where one by-
product of two decades of affirmative action might be the nominal exis-
tence of a large number of small, low-capacity minority firms. 9 Indeed,
nothing in this methodology limits the market share estimate to the minor-
ity share of the general population.9
96. This estimate is taken from the Bates Report, Frankel, supra note 93, at 428, 432 (citing
TIMOTHY BATES, OPPORTUNITY DENIED!: A STUDY OF RACIAL AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
RELATED TO Gov'T CONTRACTING IN NEW YORK STATE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1992)). A
similar methodology applied to the construction industry indicated that a 30% adjustment might
be appropriate. Id. at 431.
97. 1.2 * 11.6 = 13.92.
98. The current methodology would allow minority entrepreneurs to inflate the remedial
goal by arbitrarily creating numerous corporate personalities to bid on state projects.
99. Although it might be possible that if the number of firms was inflated above the minor-
ity percentage in the general population, the "but-for discrimination" correction might perversely
indicate that fewer firms would exist absent discrimination.
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At the end of the day, I believe it is wishful thinking to think that
firm-counting provides a more accurate benchmark than head-counting (for
example, the minority percentage among college graduates). Indeed, it
might be appropriate to do away with the first stage altogether and simply
use the second-stage regression analysis not merely as an adjustment, but to
accomplish a more sophisticated type of head-counting. The regression
method used in the New York disparity study could be used-without ever
adverting to existing number of firms-to calculate the number of minority
entrepreneurs that should exist given existing minorities' various educa-
tional and work experiences. The regression is consistent with the Croson
requirement that a state may not use procurement affirmative action to
remedy discrimination in prior educational opportunity, because it takes the
current number of minority MBAs as given. The regression, in a sense,
calculates how many of these MBAs should be entrepreneurs-assuming
that, without discrimination, minority MBAs would become entrepreneurs
at the same rate as non-minority MBAs. The multivariate regression meth-
odology, of course, controls not just for a person's MBA status, but for a
variety of human capital variables. The point is that this sophisticated
head-counting is likely to be more reliable than firm-counting: The assump-
tion that human capacities would be similar absent discrimination, while
controversial, l°° is more reliable than the assumption that firm capacity
would be similar absent discrimination. 101
B. Setting the Size of the Credits
The prior discussion only attempted to calculate the level of minority
participation at which racial credits should equal zero. It becomes all the
more Herculean to estimate what size credit is appropriate to encourage
lower levels of participation. To enunciate any particular bidding credit is
arbitrary because no empirical method exists for balancing the remedial
benefit of increasing minority participation against the various potential
costs (including inefficient production and reduced opportunities for non-
beneficiaries). And I can offer here no magic formula for calculating the
100. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994).
101. Of course, others might react to this imprecision by arguing that racially motivated
remedies are not tailored narrowly enough to pass strict scrutiny. Jeffrey Rosen for example has
said that trying to calculate this second stage is "a metaphysical, not an empirical, figure, and no
state has convincingly calculated it." Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, NEW REPUBLIC,
Apr. 22, 1996, at 21, 21. While there are certainly severe problems with such but-for regressions,
they are more precise than either head- or firm-counting.
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optimal size of bidding credits within a bidding schedule. However, it still
may be possible to make progress by recognizing that a declining credit
schedule might pass strict scrutiny even if the government cannot deduce
that this program uniquely maximizes some metric of social welfare.
Instead, the government might be able to establish strong reasons for
encouraging some minimum level of minority participation. Even though a
credit schedule relates a level of participation to a particular bidding credit
size, evidence that maintaining a minimum participation level is essential
to the government's remedial goal would go a long way toward justifying a
more substantial bidding credit-including the type of quasi-quotas
described above-even though it still would not provide very commensur-
able evidence about just how large this more substantial credit should be.
In essence then, I recommend that governments estimate multiple
market shares. As before, they would estimate the share that would
achieve the overall remedial goal, but they might also identify lower levels
of minority participation that are particularly important to effectuate the
remedy. Even though an idealized credit schedule (as depicted in the
Appendix) could comprise an infinite number of bidding credits, given the
limits of administrative feasibility, two or three bidding credit categories are
much more likely-as arbitrarily exemplified earlier in Table 1. The
government would adduce evidence that a minimum participation level is
particularly important and then, probably without more, argue that the
specific bidding credit is sufficiently tailored to meet this heightened reme-
dial need.
Evidence that a minimum market share is particularly useful or neces-
sary-even though not currently used in post-Croson litigation-might be
adduced. Industrial organization economists could estimate the minimum
efficient scale of existing minority enterprises and predict the effect of
particular size credits on the ability of these firms to exist and grow.'
Evidence that minority enterprises were establishing credit ratings and
acquiring market-specific know-how might be particularly relevant in justi-
fying a short-term safety net.
Moreover, in reviewing the size of bidding credits, the Court should be
clear to distinguish between facial and applied reviews of affirmative action
programs. As discussed above, programs that on their face grant substantial
bidding credits may not, in practice, countenance substantial disparities.
Thus, the fifty-percent bidding credits granted to minorities in FCC auc-
102. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(2d ed. 1980) (discussing minimum efficient scale).
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tions induced so many minority (and female) enterprises to form that the
vast majority of the credit was bid away. In reviewing the reasonableness of
a large credit, the Court needs to think about the likelihood that it will be
used-that is, the expected quality difference between minority and non-
minority bidders. The recent experience at the FCC auctions suggests that
even a fifty-percent bidding credit might actually reduce the expected dif-
ference between minority and non-minority bids and thus provides an
especially strong rationale for what, on its face, seems to be a rather
extreme racial subsidy.' °3
C. Overview of the "160" Federal Affirmative Action Programs
To get a handle on how much Adarand is likely to change federal
affirmative action programs, it is useful to begin with the "comprehensive
list" of race- and gender-conscious programs that the Congressional
Research Service compiled at Senator Bob Dole's request.'0° Although it
has been reported repeatedly that there are 160 programs,0 5 quantifying
the pervasiveness of affirmative action by this type of program counting is
pure folly. For example, nineteen of these programs merely "encourage"
recipients of various government grants to deposit their funds in minority-
and women-owned banks.' 6 Since so little (read: nothing) turns on these
provisions, they could probably be eliminated without affecting the viability
of minority- or women-owned banks. 10 7  If President Clinton wanted to,
he could easily halve the number of programs by eliminating the toothless
exhortations-without affecting the core preferences in federal subsidies
103. At the extreme, imagine an auction where minority bidders were allowed to pay just
one cent on the dollar for any winning bid. It is hard to conceive that competition among
minorities themselves would not bid away a substantial amount of the nominal credit. While
non-minority firms would be excluded from competing for these effectively set-aside licenses, the
expected disparity would not turn on the nominal credit, but on an analysis of the expected (or
observed) minority and non-minority demand.
104. Congressional Research Service's Compilation and Overview of Federal Laws and Regulations
Establishing Affirmative Action Goals, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147 (Special Report), at 5-75
(Aug. 1, 1995).
105. Affirmative Action: Dole Releases Affirmative Action List; GOP Renews Call to Reassess
Programs, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at A-1 (Feb. 23, 1995).
106. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 2 46.13(g) (1995) (encouraging state agencies participating in Special
Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children to make such deposits).
107. As Jeffrey Rosen points out in an excellent review of these 160 programs: "In 1992
there were only thirty-six banks owned by blacks and six banks owned by women in the country,
which makes it unlikely that they can have much influence on the credit markets, no matter how
much 'encouragement' they get from the government." Jeffrey Rosen, Affirmative Action: A
Solution, NEw REPUBLIC, May 8, 1995, at 20, 23.
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where, for example, $4.8 billion in contracts were set aside for minority and
female contractors under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) pro-
gram.',0
The Clinton administration might also defend dozens of grants for
"historically Black Colleges and Universities" (often referred to as
"HBCUs") by arguing that they are "race-neutral means to increase minor-
ity participation." Unlike women's colleges, which need to discriminate
against male applicants to preserve a female identity, many HBCUs could
maintain a minority majority with a colorblind admissions process.'
°9
However, to avoid explicit racial classifications, some of the preferences
would need to be more narrowly drawn to exclude the additional preference
for "institutions which ... [have] at least 50 percent minority [enroll-
ment]. ""° While these programs might be strongly defended on remedial
grounds,"' these very substantial preferences are inconsistent with Amar
and Katyal's diversity theory.' Far from their image of bringing diverse
racial groups together, subsidizing the continued existence of virtually all-
black colleges seems to produce just the balkanization that Amar and
Katyal claim describes private contracting."
3
108. Steven A. Holmes, Moratorium Called on Minority Contract Program, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
8, 1996, at Al.
109. HBCUs do not face the same "tipping" problem as women's colleges because not
enough non-black applicants have sought admission to HBCUs to destabilize the racial identity of
these institutions. (In contrast, just as male applicants quickly changed Vassar's gender identity,
it is likely that historically female colleges could not maintain their gender identity with a
gender-blind admissions program.)
110. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1112d(d)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
111. See Rosen, supra note 107, at 23 (arguing that these programs are the most easily
defended).
112. Amar & Katyal, supra note 3, at 1773-79.
113. Once one considers the importance of HBCUs in government-sponsored affirmative
action in education, it may be that affirmative action currently induces more balkanization in
education than in procurement markets-where critics claim at least that many minority owners
are merely figureheads that would not presumably alter the underlying employment diversity. See
Alan Finder & Thomas J. Lucek, Flaws Are Found in Dinkins Effort to Aid Minorities, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1994, at Al (finding in a three-month study that of 56 construction companies that
received large contracts, 9 companies, or 16%, "have strong business and personal ties to white
businessmen, casting doubt on their claims to be independently owned and controlled by women
or minorities"); see also Selwyn Raab, 12 Charged in Minority Businesses Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 1995, at B2 (two brothers created three front companies in racketeering scheme to fraudu-
lently obtain more than a dozen contracts intended for minority-owned companies). I could
uncover, however, little information on whether minority-owned firms hired higher proportions
of minority workers than their non-minority counterparts, save in the broadcasting field.
African-American-owned radio stations have hired African Americans in top management and
other important job categories at far higher rates than white-owned stations; the same has been
true of Hispanic hiring at Hispanic-owned stations, even as compared to Anglo-owned stations
with Spanish-language formats. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 582 n.34
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Stepping back, one sees in the comprehensive list all four permutations
of rules/standards and quotas/credits. Contrary to my earlier proposal, the
Supreme Court may scrutinize fuzzy (standard-like) racial preferences more
leniently, but at least with respect to rule-like quotas and credits which are
especially prevalent in federal procurement, the administration will need to
undertake disparity studies to establish not only its compelling remedial
interest, but to justify the size of the racial preferences. Before such studies
are completed, assessing precisely what types of programs can survive strict
scrutiny is impossible. However, this Essay has tried to show that a stark
shortfall in minority participation (compared to what it would be without
discrimination) might, consistent with the narrow tailoring principle, justify
a rule-like, explicitly racial preference.
CONCLUSION
An article reporting that the Clinton administration planned to
impose a three-year moratorium on new procurement set-asides suggested
that the administration was moving toward an approach consonant with
declining-credit schedules:
[Tihe Administration has decided to allow Federal agencies, if they
can justify it, to use other kinds of preferences, like giving price
breaks and extra points in evaluating contract bids by minority and
woman-headed companies....
... [A]gencies then determine a benchmark for the percentage of
minority or female contractors it ought to have. That benchmark
will determine what kind of affirmative action steps the agency may
take. The further away from the benchmark an agency finds itself, the
more blatant[ I preference... in contracting it may employ."
The article makes clear that the agency benchmark will be derived from the
type of post-Croson "disparity studies" described above. The last quoted
(1990) (citing David Honig, Relationships Among EEO, Program Service, and Minority Ownership in
Broadcast Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE TENTH ANNUAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE 88-89 (Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. et al. eds., 1983)); see also Matthew
L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 336 n.122 (1991)
(reporting data from Honig, supra, at 88-89, that black-owned radio stations employed blacks in
72% of all high-level job positions while white-owned, black-oriented stations employed blacks in
43% of all high-level jobs).
114. Holmes, supra note 108, at A18 (emphasis added).
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sentence, in particular, seems to indicate that the preferred racial prefer-
ences will have the essential attributes of a declining-credit schedule, in
that when minority participation is "further away from the benchmark,"
the agency can justify a larger racial credit.
I have argued that facially neutral, but racially motivated classifica-
tions are not more narrowly tailored (and may not provide a less restrictive
alternative) than explicitly racial classifications. And that in choosing
among different types of racial classifications, policymakers should consider
declining-credit schedules that reduce the marginal racial subsidy as racial
participation increases toward the overall remedial goal. Most provoca-
tively, this Essay has argued that very substantial bidding credits, which
come close to guaranteeing a minimum level of minority participation, may
be consistent with narrow tailoring-both because they better reflect the
substantial remedial benefits of maintaining a minimum, critical mass of
participation, and because guaranteeing a virtual safety net enhances the
quality of minority applicants and reduces the racial disparity among parti-
cipants.
From a narrow doctrinal perspective, something must give in Croson
and Adarand. The Supreme Court cannot consistently prohibit non-victim
races from receiving remedial subsidies and at the same time encourage
race-neutral subsidies (which include preferences for certain non-victim
whites). And if the Court chooses to privilege race-neutral means to
increase minority participation, it will likely need to abandon the "consis-
tency" principle so that it can uphold racially motivated statutes that bene-
fit the victims of racial discrimination." 5
While this Essay, has considered quotas versus credits, rules versus
standards, and race-neutral versus non-neutral means, the narrow tailoring
principle might apply on several other dimensions. For example, almost no
consideration has been given to what might be called "Coasean" tailoring:
whether it is more tailored to grant benefits directly to minorities or to
parties who contract with minorities. When the stringent assumptions of
the Coase theorem do not hold, the remedial incidence of direct and indi-
rect subsidies may diverge."16 After all, Adarand itself involved a subsidy
to a non-minority general contractor, and the Viacom controversy this past
115. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995)).
116. See, e.g., John J. Donohue, III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce
Unem&loyment Spells, YALE L.J. 549, 554 (1989) (finding empirically that bribing unemployed
workers to find employment was more effective than bribing employers to hire).
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summer involved an FCC tax subsidy for a non-minority licensee.' 17 This
Coasean choice has practical import. Most of our affirmative action efforts
are directed toward increasing the participation of minority-owned firms
and not toward increasing minority employment. While these capitalist-
centered programs have much to say for themselves,"' the vestiges of past
discrimination are at least equally prevalent in many job categories, and
increasing the power of minority capitalism may prove to be a poor method
(as seen with other "trickle down" theories) to benefit minority labor." 9
This Essay has also not discussed the crucial issue of temporal tailoring.
There are increasing indications that a majority of the Supreme Court will
require sunset provisions for affirmative action programs.2  A sunset
requirement makes most sense if discrimination is viewed strictly as a thing
of the past. If this were true, the causal nexus between the initial victims
of discrimination and the subsequent beneficiary class would become in-
creasingly attenuated. And it would become all the more difficult to esti-
mate with confidence what market share minorities would control absent
117. Viacom agreed to sell its cable television systems to a "minority-led investor group" in
what would be the largest-ever purchase of corporate assets by a minority-owned firm. One im-
petus for the sale was a tax program, administered by the FCC, that permitted companies to defer
paying capital gains taxes for two years if they sold a media property to a black, Hispanic, Asian-
American, or Native-American buyer. This deferral was, in effect, an interest-free loan.
Viacom's gain on the sale was expected to, be $1.1 billion; Congress' Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion estimated the value of the tax break to Viacom to be between $440 million and $640 mil-
lion. See Paul C. Roberts, Tax Breaks Based on Unfair Privilege, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 11,
1995, at 47A. The House and Senate later repealed this tax break. See A New Blow to Viacom
Deal, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29, 1995, at D2.
Many indirect subsidies still involve explicit racial classifications, because, as in Adarand, the
grantee is required to contract with minority enterprises. But indirect subsidies might be used to
implement a race-neutral (but racially motivated) remedy: As discussed above, grants to histori-
cally black colleges and universities (or inner-city enterprise zones) might predictably lead to
minority admissions (or employment) contracts.
118. A legitimate remedial goal might be to increase the entire distribution of minority
wealth. Under this view, the vestiges of discrimination will not be eliminated until the proba-
bility that a black will be a millionaire begins to approximate the probability that a white will be
a millionaire. Class-based substitutes for affirmative action hold out no hope of achieving this
broader "bell curve" remedy: In the extreme, they would only pile up the current minority (and
non-minority) poor just above the programs' poverty line.
119. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
120. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2118 (1995) (affirmative
action program "'will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate"'
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring))); Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 596 (1990) ("[S]uch a goal carries its own natural
limit .... The FCC's plan, like the Harvard admissions program discussed in Bakke, contains the
seed of its own termination."); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 489 ("The MBE provision may be viewed as
a pilot project, appropriately limited in extent and duration, and subject to reassessment and re-
evaluation by the Congress prior to any extension or re-enactment.").
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discrimination. Under such conditions, a temporally tailored program
might gradually decrease the market share at which bidding credits (or
other plus factors) are phased out.' Notice this temporal tailoring seeks
to achieve diacronically what.the declining-credit schedule seeks to achieve
syncronically. Indeed, declining-credit schedules can help provide evidence
of whether racial preferences are still necessary to induce the desired level
of minority participation.'22 If credits diminish toward zero as participa-
tion rises toward the remedial goal, then the goal will only be reached if
the weakest minority bidder can participate in the market with a very small
subsidy. As long as the vestiges of discrimination increase the costs of
minority bidders, it is unlikely that a declining-credit schedule would over-
shoot the overall remedial goal-so there would be a smaller likelihood that
courts will suspend a program mistakenly thinking that the credits are no
longer necessary.
Let me quickly add, however, the assumption that discrimination is a
thing of the past is repeatedly and strongly contradicted by a wide variety of
empiricism.' We would not consider imposing a sunset requirement on
traditional remedies for tortious assault, because we have evidence that
assault continues to occur in the present day. A sufficient showing that the
government is-to use the generative Croson phrase-"a passive partici-
pant" in present acts of disparate racial treatment strongly rebuts the
unqualified argument that remedial affirmative action must soon end. To
satisfy strict scrutiny, agencies should consider testing for both private and
public disparate treatment as part of on-going "disparity studies.'
24
While this Essay has at times used economics to illuminate the narrow
tailoring principle, let me end by emphasizing that there are many issues
where economics is not particularly helpful. For example, I doubt whether
economic analysis could help illuminate whether the remedial basis for
121. Thus, even if one estimated in the past that 30% of industry revenues would be con-
trolled by minority-owned firms absent discrimination, narrow tailoring might require that bid-
ding credits phase out in future years at progressively lower levels.122. This evidence is relevant because courts might wish to end a racial subsidy not only
because the beneficiary class was insufficiently related to the injured class, but also because the
beneficiary class would participate even without the subsidy.
123. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New
Car, 85 AM. EcoN. REV. 304 (1995) (documenting disparate treatment in new car sales); John
Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. EcoN.
REV. 881 (1986) (documenting disparate treatment in housing); PrimeTime Live, supra note 57
(hidden cameras recorded disparate treatment against black tester in variety of retail contexts).
124. Post-Croson disparity studies often include anecdotal, self-reported evidence of discrimi-
nation, but fail to engage in the kind of controlled experimentation that has provided such
powerful evidence in the Fair Housing context. See Yinger, supra note 123.
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affirmative action is a "compelling state interest." But tailoring a remedy
to further a particular goal may constitute a type of low-level "tinkering" in
which economics-especially with its focus on marginal costs and
benefits-may aid constitutional policymaking."'
125. Judge Stephen Reinhardt suggested the usefulness of such low-level "tinkering."
1828 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
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APPENDIX
In the following discussion, whether a program is narrowly tailored is
assessed using marginal cost-benefit analysis. Marginalism is particularly
appropriate for the task because it focuses on whether incremental increases
in the scope of one program or another is worth the candle. However, to
proceed, I need to make some highly reductive assumptions about the gen-
eral shape of the marginal costs and marginal benefits. 6 The goal here
is merely to describe the slope that the marginal cost and benefit curves
might take and to show the possibility that an invariant quota might be more
effective (read: more narrowly tailored) than an invariant credit in inducing
the desired minority participation.
To undertake this comparison, I begin by making several assumptions
about the effects of different affirmative action programs in an Adarand-like
procurement context. These assumptions allow me to apply the analysis
from Martin Weitzman's classic article, Prices vs. Quantities. 7 Just as
Weitzman's article questioned the "vague preference" that economists have
toward price subsidies,"' my purpose here will be to show that the prefer-ence for bidding or other price-like credits is overstated.
126. Consonant with the assumption that remedying discrimination is a compelling govern-
mental interest, assume that total social benefits of increasing the participation of minority con-
tractors (including the benefit of remedying past discrimination) outweigh the total social costs
(including the potentially higher costs of construction and all pecuniary and nonpecuniary costs
induced by a race-based government subsidy). Moreover, assume that all these costs and benefits
are commensurable and can be given quantitative representation.
127. Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). Similar
analysis applied to law and economics can be found in Robert Cooter's fine writing. See Cooter,
supra note 75; see also William Poole, Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple
Stochastic Macro Model, 84 Q.J. ECON. 197 (1970).
128. Weitzman noted:
From a strictly theoretical point of view there is really nothing to recommend one mode
of control over the other. This notwithstanding, I think it is a fair generalization to say
that the average economist in the Western marginalist tradition has at least a vague
preference toward indirect control by prices, just as the typical non-economist leans
toward the direct regulation of quantities. ...
A reason often cited for the theoretical superiority of prices as planning instruments
is that their use allegedly economizes on information. The main thing to note here is that
generally speaking it is neither easier nor harder to name the right prices than the right
quantities because in principle exactly the same information is needed to correctly specify
either.
Weitzman, supra note 127, at 477-78 (first emphasis added).
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Figure 2: With an Upward Sloping Marginal Cost
Curve, Larger Credits Induce Larger Minority Participa-
tion
I first assume that the general contractor's marginal costs of increasing
minority participation are increasing.129 This assumption is depicted in
Figure 2 by the upward sloping marginal cost curve where the horizontal
axis measures some quantum of minority participation such as the dollar
revenue going to minority subcontractors (or the number of minority
employees), and the vertical axis measures the marginal cost in dollars.
This increasing marginal cost curve also crucially describes how the con-
tractor will react to various minority subcontracting- credits. The first
credits that we consider are constant marginal subsidies for increased minor-
ity participation. Rational decisionmakers will respond to a credit by
129. This assumption is controversial. If general contractors discriminate against better
qualified minority subcontracting bids, then increasing minority participation need not increase
costs.
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increasing minority participation to the point where the marginal costs
equals this constant marginal subsidy. 13' As shown in the figure, if a gen-
eral contractor is offered C* dollars for each unit increase in minority parti-
cipation, then the general contractor would increase minority participation
by Q*. And intuitively increasing the size of the credit (say, in Figure 2, up
to C') induces the general contractor to increase minority participation
even more (to Q').
To complete the model, we need to consider the marginal costs and
benefits of increased minority participation to others in society. The goal
here is to think about the shape of a "Marginal Net Benefits" (MNB) curve
which aggregates the marginal impact on social welfare of increasing minor-
ity participation (excluding only the costs to the general contractor which
are already captured in the marginal cost curve). Under our assumption
that the total benefits of increasing minority participation are larger than
the social cost, it must be true that the marginal net benefits are positive
for at least some increases in minority participation.1
Moreover, there are strong theoretical reasons to think that the MNB
curve must at some point slope downward. While the net benefits of creat-
ing "token" minority participation may be small, the marginal net benefits
must at some point start to decline toward zero. Once a minority parti-
cipation reaches what it would be without discrimination, there is no
reason to think that the marginal net benefit of using subsidies to increase
participation beyond this point would be positive: The benefit of remedying
past discrimination would no longer be present and the cost to the non-
beneficiary race, if anything, would be exacerbated.
130. We might be concerned that discriminators would not hire the best qualified minority
subcontractors. For example, general contractors might prefer to lose some potential profits
rather than disturb their stereotyped views of minority inferiority. However, even if general
contractors acted in this perverse way, it is not clear how such behavior should affect the govern-
ment's choice between credits or quotas. Under either a credit or a quota, the general contractor
might refuse to choose the most qualified minority contractor. And even given prejudiced dispo-
sition, one would still expect greater subsidies to lead to greater levels of minority hiring.
131. The model also assumes that the marginal net benefits curve is not affected by the
choice of quotas or credits. One might argue that inducing a particular level of minority parti-
cipation via a quota would produce smaller net benefits than a credit because quotas are offensive
to many people in our society. As argued in earlier, however, the legitimate interest (fundamen-
tal right) of non-beneficiaries is to be free from the negative effects of racially motivated laws
(unless such laws are narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest). And
because credits or quotas are both racially motivated, any injury that non-beneficiaries experience
because of the type of means is not constitutionally cognizable.
1831
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Figure 3: Marginal Net Benefit Curve Ultimately Extin-
guished When Minority Participation Reaches What It
Would Have Been in Absence of Discrimination
The assumption that marginal (net) benefits of affirmative action are
generally downward sloping is depicted graphically in Figure 3. Because the
marginal benefit of inducing token participation is not as large, the MNB
curve rises from Q' to Q". But after overcoming this "token" effect and
reaching some critical mass, the curve declines toward Point Q', which
represents the participation that minorities would have attained in the
absence of discrimination. The MNB curve might hit the horizontal axis
before this "proportional representation" point depending on how one
accounts for the burdens to non-beneficiaries. For purposes of this analysis,
what is important is that the marginal cost curve generally declines after
1832 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
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minority participation reaches some critical mass, and that the marginal
benefits for government to induce increased participation are extinguished
at least by the time minority participation is what it would have been
absent discrimination.
Even though there may well be factors-such as the "token" effect-
that cause the marginal benefit curve to slope upwards, the remainder of
this Appendix (for simplicity) considers only downward sloping MNB
curves. Again, I only need to show that the MNB curve might plausibly be
downward sloping and that the general contractor's marginal cost curve
might be upward sloping. Accepting that aparticular market might exhibit
such marginal costs and benefits is enough to assess whether quotas or
credits are more narrowly tailored.
To make the question interesting, we need to introduce some uncer-
tainty about how the general contractor will react to a credit scheme. If
the marginal cost and net benefit curves are precisely known, then either a
quota or credit might implement the same equilibrium. 32  By identifying
the intersection of the two curves, a social planner could choose a quota or
credit that tailors the increased minority participation to the government
compelling interest. This is done in Figure 4 by a credit set at C* or quota
set at Q*.
To make quotas and credits non-equivalent policy instruments, imag-
ine that the government is uncertain about how much higher minority bids
will be than white subcontracting bids. 133 There are many types of uncer-
tainty that the government might face, but (just to create a simple example)
assume that the slope of the marginal cost curve is known, but that the
intercept of the curve might be shifted either up or down by some
amount, .134
132. Weitzman made a similar point: "In an environment of complete knowledge and perfect
certainty there is a formal identity between the use of prices and quantities as planning instru-
ments .... If there is any advantage to employing price or quantity control modes, therefore, it
must be due to inadequate information or uncertainty." Weitzman, supra note 127, at 480.
133. Uncertainty in the marginal benefit curve does not affect the choice between credit or
quota, because uncertainty about external social benefits does not shift the decisionmaker's reac-
tion curve.
134. For concreteness, imagine that half the time the marginal cost curve is shifted up and
half the time it is shifted down. However, the analysis would be true for a great many other
specifications, including, for example, if the MC curve were equally likely to be shifted up, down,
or not at all.
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Figure 4: Equivalence of Quotas and Credits When
Marginal Costs and Benefits Curves Are Known with
Certainty
With these assumptions we can explore graphically whether a quota or
a credit is more successful. A perfectly tailored rule would make the degree
of minority participation depend on the relative strength of the minority
bidders. If minority bids are unexpectedly high, increasing minority partici-
pation is more expensive-so the optimal amount of participation is lower..
Analogously, if the minority bids are unexpectedly low, increasing minority
participation is less expensive and the optimal participation rate is higher.
These optimum participation rates for the two possible states of the world
are depicted in Figure 5 by q*L and q*H which represent the quantities
where the MNB curve intersects the two possible MC curves.
Figure 5 can help us assess how well quotas or credits succeed in tailor-
ing actual participation rates to these optimal benchmarks. The quota
induces minority participation of qQ regardless of whether the minority
bidders enter relatively high or low bids. When the minority bids are unex-
pectedly high, the quota induces too much minority participation (qQ >
q*H). The inefficiency caused by this oversupply is represented in Figure 5
by a triangle drawn between the optimal and actual quantity: When the
1834 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1781 (1996)
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minority bids are unexpectedly high, the marginal cost of minority partici-
pation at qQ is s larger than the marginal net benefit. The marginal cost to
the general contractor remains above the marginal net benefit to the rest of
society at all points between qQ and q*u, and the triangle area represents
the total loss in welfare from the quota's failure to tailor when minority
bids are unexpectedly high.
Quantity
qcjj q*H qQ q*L qCL
H] Quota Inefficiency l Credit Inefficiency
Figure 5: Example of Credit (Price Subsidy) Being More
Efficient Than Quota-Caused by Substantial Uncer-
tainty About Costs of Quota
Quotas create an analogous inefficiency by inducing too little minority
participation when minority bids are unexpectedly low. When the cost of
increasing minority participation is unexpectedly low, the optimum minor-
ity participation is greater than the quota (q*L > q0), but the quota
restrains participation to a level where the marginal benefit is greater than
the marginal cost. The tailoring inefficiency associated with this shortfall is
depicted by an analogous triangle.
Figure 5 also shows, however, that a simple credit fails to induce the
optimum participation rates. Quotas are inefficient because they do not
vary with the strength of minority bids; credits are inefficient because they
vary too much. When minority bids are unexpectedly high, the quota
mandates too much minority participation, but Figure 5 shows that a credit
induces too little participation. General contractors responding to a credit
and high minority bids will increase minority hiring only to the point
1835
HeinOnline -- 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1835 1995-1996
where the marginal subsidy of the credit equals the marginal cost of increas-
ing minority participation. In Figure 5, this point occurs at qcH. But at
this level of participation, the marginal net benefits to society are larger
than the marginal costs. The tailoring inefficiency associated with this
shortfall is represented by the smaller, shaded triangle between qcH and qQ.
An analogous tailoring inefficiency is created when minority bids are unex-
pectedly low: The credit now induces too much minority participation (qcL
> qQ), which is depicted by an analogous small triangle.
Comparing the tailoring inefficiencies, Figure 5 reveals the conven-
tional result. The quota produces a less-tailored outcome than the credit.
The credit is better tailored because it produces participation rates that are
closer to the optimal.135 Credits induce more variation in minority parti-
cipation. Thus, for the assumed marginal cost and benefit curves, making
minority participation sensitive to the strength of minority bids is more
tailored than making minority participation completely invariant. The
residual inefficiency of the credit is caused by general contractors ignoring
the marginal benefits of enhanced minority participation; they only inter-
nalize the constant marginal subsidy of the credit. But as drawn in Figure 5
the externality caused by the credit is small, because the marginal benefit
curve is relatively flat-meaning that under a credit there are only slight
differences between the marginal benefits to society and the marginal sub-
sidy created by the simple, invariant credit.
If we stopped here, there would be little added-value for this economic
modeling. Consistent with Powell's discussion in Bakke, Figure 5 shows
that a quota is less well tailored to the government's compelling interest
than a credit. However, it is easy to construct an example in which the
quota is better tailored than the credit. Indeed, if we merely increase the
steepness of the marginal net benefit curve, the quota can become the
better tailored means. Figure 6 shows just this possibility. As before, a
credit makes the minority participation rate more sensitive to the strength
of minority bidding. But in this case, the swings in minority participation
are excessive compared to what an optimally tailored participation would
be: The mandated quota participation (qQ) is closer to the optimal partici-
pation (q*H and q') than the level induced by the credit (qcH and qct).
The deviations from the optimal participation level create analogous ineffi-
135. Graphically q*H - qCH < qQ - q*H.
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ciency triangles, but in Figure 6 the tailoring inefficiency of the credit is






Figure 6: Examples of Quota Being More Efficient Than
Credit (Price Subsidy)-Caused by Uncertainty About
How Decisionmaker Will Respond to Credit
The geometry suggests that quotas become better tailored (relative to
credits) as (1) the marginal benefit curve becomes steeper or (2) themarginal
cost curves becomes flatter. 13 6  But what is the intuition behind this
counterintuitive result? The flatness of the marginal cost curve determines
how sensitive minority participation will be to size of the credit. If the
marginal cost curve is very flat, then unexpectedly high minority bids will
cause a large decline in minority participation, and unexpectedly low
minority bids will cause a large increase in minority participation.' In
other words, if a number of minority contractors are likely to place similar
bids (but the government is uncertain about how much higher these bids
136. Indeed, in this model, the quota will be better tailored than the credit, whenever (the
absolute value of) the marginal benefit curve slope is greater than the marginal cost curve slope.
137. Conversely, if the marginal cost curve is very steep, then even unexpectedly high or low
minority bids will not dramatically affect minority participation.
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will be than the white bids), it will be very difficult for the government to
assess how a particular credit will affect minority participation. If the
government sets the credit too low, the general contractor will not be
willing to hire any minorities, but if the government sets the credit too
high, the general contractor may hire only minorities. The slope of the
marginal cost curve thus shows how much variation in minority participa-
tion will result from the use of simple credit.
The slope of the marginal net benefits curve then determines the size
of the externality associated with this variation. As argued above, when a
general contractor decides to reduce minority participation because of
unexpectedly high minority bids, it only internalizes the foregone credit
subsidy. The general contractor does not consider the foregone opportunity
to remedy discrimination. When the marginal net benefit curve is steep,
this externality problem becomes larger, and credits accordingly do a poorer
job of tailoring minority participation to the government's compelling
interest.
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